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Brown notes ASML's light sources come from Cymer in the US or Gigaphoton in Japan. If Japan aligns on DUV, the US and Japan can block all immersion systems to China through national light-source controls without using extraterritorial FDPR authority.
Nick Brown says the bill would move advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including DUV immersion, from entity-specific restrictions to countrywide controls. It also aligns Dutch and Japanese controls on all SME to SMIC and CXMT with US rules, after a 150-day negotiation window.
Reports of China building a working EUV lithography machine are misleading. The effort appears to be an assembly of smuggled components from ASML's existing supply chain, not a story of domestic innovation. This frames the primary challenge as one of export control evasion rather than a rapid technological leap by China.
Brown says cutting ASML and Tokyo Electron servicing at advanced fabs will not immediately halt production; Chinese contractors and parts may fill some gaps. But advanced subsystems like the light source and stages likely degrade yield and throughput starting around six to twelve months.
The global supply chain for cutting-edge AI chips is a major chokepoint, ideal for governance. Three companies design them, one (TSMC) manufactures over 90%, and one Dutch firm (ASML) makes the essential machinery. This concentration makes tracking and controlling compute resources feasible for a global coalition.
Nick Brown says EUV gets the attention, but allowed NXT:1980 DUV immersion systems can support seven-nanometer logic and HBM used in Huawei's Ascend chips. China imported about 90 systems in 2024-25, over $10 billion, nearly two-thirds of ASML's immersion exports.
China will likely struggle to indigenously manufacture commercial DUV immersion lithography tools until the mid-2030s, long after domesticating deposition or etch tools. Because only Japan and the Netherlands produce them, lithography remains the West's most durable geopolitical lever.
To counter US threats of restricting chip access, an allied coalition can leverage its own critical positions in the upstream semiconductor supply chain. By controlling assets like ASML's manufacturing equipment or Japanese/Korean high-bandwidth memory, they can create the conditions for a mutually beneficial deal on chip allocation.
Brown ran a scenario where China prototypes a seven-nanometer-equivalent DUV next year, reaches commercial production the year after, and scales 100% annually. Even then, existing stockpile plus indigenous production does not come close to US-allied production if imports are cut off.
Existing export restrictions left older DUV immersion systems unrestricted, allowing China to double its installed base. Halting all DUV tool flows could cap China's domestic chip production at roughly 10 million chips annually, maintaining a massive US compute advantage.
Brown and the hosts argue Match Act import bans will not crater China's chip output overnight; effects build over years, especially for item exports. Unlike 2025 tariff shocks or the 50% rule, this slower burn may not trigger acute retaliation.