The claim of an AI-driven productivity boom is suspect when compared to the 1990s. Key indicators are moving in the wrong direction: prices for tech commodities like software and chips are rising instead of falling, and real income growth is weak, not accelerating.

Contrary to the feeling of rapid technological change, economic data shows productivity growth has been extremely low for 50 years. AI is not just another incremental improvement; it's a potential shock to a long-stagnant system, which is crucial context for its impact.

Despite widespread adoption, Patrick Collison notes that AI has not yet produced measurable gains in macroeconomic productivity. He points to recent studies and the lack of corresponding GDP growth outside the U.S. as evidence that the diffusion of these technologies through the economy is slow and complex.

Despite strong productivity numbers alongside flat job growth, economists believe it is too early for AI to be the primary driver. The gains are more likely attributable to businesses becoming more dynamic and achieving better labor-market matches following the pandemic disruptions, rather than a widespread technological revolution.

Current spikes in labor productivity are not evidence of AI's impact. They are more likely a statistical artifact caused by a compositional bias towards capital-intensive sectors and companies forcing remaining employees to do more work in a weak labor market. The true AI productivity effect is not yet visible in aggregate data.

Productivity models often wrongly assume time saved by AI is redeployed into other work. In reality, many employees use efficiency gains to finish early. This 'human slack' factor dampens macro-level productivity gains, except in highly driven fields like tech, where workers use it to work even more.

The anticipated AI productivity boom may already be happening but is invisible in statistics. Current metrics excel at measuring substitution (replacing a worker) but fail to capture quality improvements when AI acts as a complement, making professionals like doctors or bankers better at their jobs. This unmeasured quality boost is a major blind spot.

Initial data from industries with high AI exposure shows productivity gains are driven by increased output, not reduced labor hours. This counters the common narrative that AI's primary effect will be immediate, widespread job displacement, suggesting a period of augmentation precedes automation.

Just as electricity's impact was muted until factory floors were redesigned, AI's productivity gains will be modest if we only use it to replace old tools (e.g., as a better Google). Significant economic impact will only occur when companies fundamentally restructure their operations and workflows to leverage AI's unique capabilities.