Despite strong productivity numbers alongside flat job growth, economists believe it is too early for AI to be the primary driver. The gains are more likely attributable to businesses becoming more dynamic and achieving better labor-market matches following the pandemic disruptions, rather than a widespread technological revolution.
Contrary to the dominant job-loss narrative, a Vanguard study reveals that occupations highly exposed to AI are experiencing faster growth in both jobs and wages. This suggests AI is currently acting as a productivity tool that increases the value of labor rather than replacing it.
Despite AI's narrative as a labor-replacement technology, NVIDIA's booming chip sales are occurring alongside strong job growth. This suggests that, for now, AI is acting as a productivity tool that is creating economic expansion and new roles faster than it is causing net job destruction.
The combination of solid GDP growth and weaker job creation is not necessarily a warning sign, but a structural shift. With productivity growth rebounding to its 2% historical average and labor supply constrained by lower immigration, the economy can grow robustly without adding as many jobs as in the past.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell stated that after accounting for statistical anomalies, "job creation is pretty close to zero." He directly attributes this to CEOs confirming that AI allows them to operate with fewer people, marking a major official acknowledgment of AI's deflationary effect on the labor market.
Human intuition is a poor gauge of AI's actual productivity benefits. A study found developers felt significantly sped up by AI coding tools even when objective measurements showed no speed increase. The real value may come from enabling tasks that otherwise wouldn't be attempted, rather than simply accelerating existing workflows.
The tangible economic effect of the AI boom is currently concentrated in physical capital investment, such as data centers and software, rather than widespread changes in labor productivity or employment. A potential market correction would thus directly threaten this investment-led growth.
The labor market faces a dual threat. Weak demand, linked to tariffs and deglobalization, has already pushed job growth to zero. As AI adoption accelerates productivity, it could further suppress labor demand, potentially tipping the economy into a state of net job decline.
Instead of immediate, widespread job cuts, the initial effect of AI on employment is a reduction in hiring for roles like entry-level software engineers. Companies realize AI tools boost existing staff productivity, thus slowing the need for new hires, which acts as a leading indicator of labor shifts.
Even if AI drives productivity, it may not fuel broad economic growth. The benefits are expected to be narrowly distributed, boosting stock values for the wealthy rather than wages for the average worker. This wealth effect has diminishing returns and won't offset weaker spending from the middle class.
History shows a significant delay between tech investment and productivity gains—10 years for PCs, 5-6 for the internet. The current AI CapEx boom faces a similar risk. An 'AI wobble' may occur when impatient investors begin questioning the long-delayed returns.