U.S. sanctions, intended to pressure the Venezuelan regime, create a legal barrier that prevents creditors and the government from even beginning negotiations on restructuring its defaulted debt. The path to resolution is ironically blocked by the very policy designed to force it.

Unlike equity investors hunting for uncapped upside, debt lenders have a fixed return and are intolerant to losing principal. This forces them to be paranoid about downside risk and worst-case scenarios. Their diligence process is often more thorough and thoughtful, providing a different and rigorous lens on the business.

In a future restructuring, the typical fight between creditors and citizens will likely be preceded by a new top tier of claimants. The U.S. government, seeking to cover its intervention costs, and oil companies, needing payment for past expropriations, will likely get first access to revenues.

A massive quarterly jump in "lien subordination" protections (to 84% of deals) signals a strategic shift among lenders. Instead of focusing on terms that prevent default, they are obsessed with securing their place in the payment line during bankruptcy, suggesting they view distress as increasingly likely.

Private equity giants like Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR are marking the same distressed private loan at widely different values (82, 70, and 91 cents on the dollar). This lack of a unified mark-to-market standard obscures true risk levels, echoing the opaque conditions that preceded the 2008 subprime crisis.

In a distressed scenario, simply asserting seniority as a junior capital provider is ineffective. You cannot force the majority owner and management team, whom you've just told are worthless, to run the business for your benefit. The only viable path is to renegotiate and realign incentives for all parties to work towards a recovery together.

Aggressive Liability Management Exercises (LMEs), common in the US, are rarer in Europe. This isn't due to a gentler culture but stricter laws where board directors can face criminal charges for insolvency. This incentivizes collaborative restructuring over contentious, US-style creditor battles.

The focus in distressed sovereign debt has shifted beyond country fundamentals. Investors are now performing deep analysis on novel state-contingent debt instruments created during recent restructurings in countries like Zambia and Sri Lanka, scrutinizing their complex trigger mechanisms and payout structures for alpha.

When considering debt, the most critical due diligence is not on deal terms but on the lender's character. Investigate how they have treated portfolio companies during challenging times. Partnering with a lender who will "blow you up" at the first sign of trouble is a catastrophic risk.