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The current Fed posture of potentially resuming rate hikes after a mid-cycle easing is exceptionally rare. Historical analysis reveals only two comparable episodes, both in the late 1990s, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions for today’s market from past precedent.

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The market's expectation of significant Fed rate cuts is historically unfounded given current economic strength. With nominal GDP tracking so high, any rate cuts would likely fuel further nominal growth (either real growth or inflation), putting upward pressure on long-term interest rates and making duration risk in bonds dangerous.

The Federal Reserve is tightening policy just as forward-looking inflation indicators are pointing towards a significant decline. This pro-cyclical move, reacting to lagging data from a peak inflation print, is a "classic Fed error" that unnecessarily tightens financial conditions and risks derailing the economy.

While the 1999-2000 Fed hiking cycle saw significant yield curve flattening, a key driver was the Treasury's buyback program for long-end bonds amid fiscal surpluses. This unique fiscal context complicates its use as a direct analog for today’s market, which faces large deficits.

The Federal Reserve is easing monetary policy at a time when corporate earnings are already growing strongly. This rare combination has only occurred once in the last 40 years, in 1998, which was followed by two more years of a powerful bull market run.

In the early stages of a Fed easing cycle, short-term rates fall while long-term rates remain sticky, causing the yield curve to steepen. The rally in long-dated bonds only occurs much later, after investors get comfortable with low rates and begin chasing carry trades.

The bond market will become volatile not when rates hit a certain number, but when the market perceives the Fed's cutting cycle has ended and the next move could be a hike. This "legitimate pause" will cause a rapid, painful steepening of the yield curve.

Contrary to the popular memory of him letting the 90s boom run hot, Alan Greenspan's Fed aggressively hiked rates to 6.5% by 2000. This was a preemptive move to curb inflation and irrational exuberance, even amid strong productivity growth.

Jeff Gundlach notes a significant market anomaly: long-term interest rates have risen substantially since the Fed began its recent cutting cycle. Historically, Fed cuts have always led to lower long-term rates. This break in precedent suggests a fundamental regime change in the bond market.

Current rate cuts, intended as risk management, are not a one-way street. By stimulating the economy, they raise the probability that the Fed will need to reverse course and hike rates later to manage potential outperformance, creating a "two-sided" risk distribution for investors.

With multiple rate hikes priced into the curve, the market has reached peak hawkishness. This creates an asymmetric opportunity where a bet against hikes can win even if the Fed does nothing. A flat policy would lead to a "passive ease" as priced-in hikes are removed from the curve.

A Fed Hike-Ease-Hike Cycle Is a Monetary Policy 'Unicorn' Only Seen in the Late 1990s | RiffOn