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In 2022, China was adding 30-35% of the world's new AI compute. Due to U.S. export controls, that figure has now plummeted to below 10%. This creates a widening capabilities gap, with China projected to have less than 30 gigawatts of lower-quality compute by 2028.
Focusing on the shrinking AI model quality gap between the US and China is misleading. The most critical, long-term differentiator is the West's 10-12x advantage in compute power. This fundamentally limits China's ability to deploy AI at scale, regardless of model sophistication.
China's push for open-source AI may not be purely strategic but a consequence of US export controls limiting their inference compute. Unable to monetize closed APIs effectively to a skeptical Western market, Chinese labs release models to build influence and attract talent, as few would pay for a sub-frontier, China-hosted service.
China's push for open-weight models is not just ideological but a strategic necessity. Lacking compute for large-scale inference and facing a tough market for their closed models, open-sourcing is a way to gain traction, talent, and influence where US controls have limited them.
The performance gap between Chinese and American frontier AI models is not due to a lack of talent or different training techniques. Instead, it is primarily constrained by access to massive-scale compute and the capital required to procure it.
The inability to access OpenAI, Claude, or advanced GPUs in China left its massive market and talent pool with no choice but to build its own alternatives. This protectionist policy, intended to stifle China's progress, has ironically catalyzed the creation of a powerful, self-sufficient AI industry.
Facing U.S. export controls on NVIDIA chips, Chinese AI lab Zhipu is exploring custom chip design. This move, driven by necessity and surging demand for its powerful, affordable models, shows how geopolitical pressure is inadvertently accelerating China's development of a self-sufficient, vertically integrated AI hardware ecosystem.
Contrary to their intent, U.S. export controls on AI chips have backfired. Instead of crippling China's AI development, the restrictions provided the necessary incentive for China to aggressively invest in and accelerate its own semiconductor industry, potentially eroding the U.S.'s long-term competitive advantage.
China's superior ability to rapidly build energy infrastructure and data centers means it could have outpaced US firms in building massive AI training facilities. Export controls are the primary reason Chinese hyperscalers haven't matched the massive capital spending of their US counterparts.
The October 2022 chip export controls were intended to hobble China's AI progress and give the US a decisive strategic advantage. However, years later, the lead is estimated at a mere eight months for frontier models. The policy has not delivered the intended gap and shouldn't hinder collaboration on shared safety interests.
The effectiveness of US export controls on advanced AI chips stems from a deep technological gap. According to China's own projections, it won't be able to domestically produce chips as powerful as those the US is restricting until 2028, creating a significant and lasting strategic advantage for democracies.