The primary growth driver for Mexican airlines like Volaris is not taking share from rivals, but converting travelers from the country's massive long-range bus industry. With 3 billion annual bus passengers, airlines tap a huge, underpenetrated market by offering a superior value proposition on a dollar-per-hour basis, fueling structural demand growth.
US legacy carriers like Delta successfully neutralized low-cost threats (Spirit, Frontier) by introducing "Basic Economy" fares. Leveraging their scale and loyalty programs, they could price-discriminate, matching LCC prices on a fraction of their seats while maintaining premium pricing on the rest, effectively starving competitors of the price-sensitive traffic they relied on.
Travis Kalanick intentionally cut prices to trigger a growth flywheel: lower fares led to more riders, which attracted more drivers, enabling even lower prices. This strategy didn't just steal share from taxis; it fundamentally expanded the total addressable market for personal transportation.
Instead of saturating a single major city, Archer plans to sell small batches of 20-50 aircraft across a thousand smaller markets. This 'breadth over depth' strategy avoids public backlash and regulatory bottlenecks, allowing them to build a massive business before tackling high-density urban air taxi services.
Despite attractive growth, new airlines struggle to enter the Mexican market due to the incumbents' scale. Volaris and Viva, controlling a large portion of domestic capacity, can strategically add flights and slash prices on any route a new entrant attempts to serve. This pricing power ensures any startup would be driven to bankruptcy within months.
Volaris and Viva can likely win regulatory approval for their merger by offering a political quid pro quo. By shifting capacity to the former president's underutilized, military-run Felipe Ángeles airport (AIFA), they allow the government to declare its controversial infrastructure project a success, creating a powerful non-economic incentive for approval.
David Risher dismisses the zero-sum view of competing with Uber. He points out that the total rideshare market (2.5B annual rides) is dwarfed by the personal car market (160B rides). Lyft's true growth strategy is to convert personal car trips into rideshare, making direct competition a much smaller part of the picture.
Beyond low fares, Ryanair's long-term dominance stems from its financial strategy of investing when the industry is weak. The airline uses its large cash reserves to place massive, discounted aircraft orders with manufacturers like Boeing during slumps and opportunistically seizes market share when legacy carriers falter. This turns competitors' crises into major growth opportunities.
Lyft's CEO argues the competition is not a binary battle with Uber for their combined 2.5 billion annual rides. Instead, the true target market is the 160 billion rides Americans take in their own cars. This reframes the opportunity from market share theft to massive market expansion and conversion.
The proposed merger combines Volaris's owner (Indigo Partners), which secures bulk discounts on Airbus orders, with Viva's owner, who also controls Mexico's largest bus conglomerate. This creates a powerful synergy: a low-cost fleet supplied by the ultimate customer acquisition funnel (the bus network), forming a unique and sustainable competitive moat.
A significant portion of both Volaris's and Viva's fleets are grounded due to a defect in Pratt & Whitney engines. While a financial drag, this has impacted both major low-cost carriers equally because they operate identical fleets. This symmetrical headwind prevents one from gaining a market share advantage while the other is capacity constrained.