Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) that extended debt maturities a few years ago are proving to be temporary fixes, not cures. Many of these same companies are returning for "LME 2.0" because fundamental business issues—like weak consumer demand or high input costs—were never resolved, making the initial "kick the can" strategy ineffective.
While lower rates seem beneficial for leveraged companies, the context is critical. The Federal Reserve typically cuts rates in response to a weakening economy. This economic downturn usually harms issuer fundamentals more than the lower borrowing costs can help, making rate-cutting cycles a net negative for high-yield credit.
Out-of-court restructurings, or LMEs, introduce uncertainty into a company's capital structure. This forces the market to apply an additional 10-20 point discount to the trading price of the company's loans, creating a significant alpha-generating opportunity for specialized investors who can accurately underwrite the LME process.
The proposal of a 50-year mortgage is not a solution but a symptom of a deeply unhealthy economy. It's like giving insulin to a diabetic: it manages the immediate problem (unaffordable payments) without addressing the root cause (a severe lack of housing supply and inflationary pressures).
The increase in Payment-In-Kind (PIK) debt to 15-25% of BDC portfolios is not a sign of innovative structuring. Instead, it often results from "amend and extend" processes where weakened companies can no longer afford cash interest payments. This "zombification" signals underlying credit deterioration.
LMEs became popular because issuers could exploit out-of-court processes to their advantage, often by playing creditors against each other. As creditors have become more collaborative, this advantage has diminished, making LMEs less beneficial for issuers and likely capping their future frequency. Vanguard treats all LMEs as defaults.
Lacking demand for long-term bonds, the Treasury issues massive short-term debt. This requires a larger cash balance (TGA) to avoid failed auctions, draining liquidity from the very markets needed to finance this debt, creating a self-reinforcing crisis dynamic.
Citing a lesson from former Goldman Sachs CFO David Viniar, Alan Waxman argues the root cause of financial crises isn't bad credit, but liquidity crunches from mismatched assets and liabilities (e.g., funding long-term assets with short-term debt). This pattern repeats as investors collectively forget the lesson over time.
Rapidly scaling companies can have fantastic unit economics but face constant insolvency risk. The cash required for advance hiring and inventory means you're perpetually on the edge of collapse, even while growing revenue by triple digits. You are going out of business every day.
Instead of labeling a potential issue like negative cash flow as a definitive "red flag," which can be misleading, view it as a "flammable item." By itself, it may be harmless. The real danger only materializes when a "spark"—a catalyst like a new competitor or rising interest rates—is introduced.
The popular narrative of a looming 'wall of maturities' is a fallacy used in investor presentations. Good companies proactively refinance their debt well ahead of time. It's only the poorly managed or fundamentally flawed businesses that are unable to refinance and face a maturity crisis, a fact the market quickly identifies.