While lower rates seem beneficial for leveraged companies, the context is critical. The Federal Reserve typically cuts rates in response to a weakening economy. This economic downturn usually harms issuer fundamentals more than the lower borrowing costs can help, making rate-cutting cycles a net negative for high-yield credit.

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The primary threat to the high-yield market isn't a wave of corporate defaults, but rather a reversion of the compressed risk premium that investors demand. This premium has been historically low, and a return to normal levels presents a significant valuation risk, even if fundamentals remain stable.

A prolonged shutdown leaves the data-dependent Federal Reserve "flying blind." This uncertainty, combined with the shutdown's negative economic impact, creates a downside risk that reinforces the case for monetary easing. The lack of new data makes it easier to continue the current cutting cycle.

Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

Due to massive government debt, the Fed's tools work paradoxically. Raising rates increases the deficit via higher interest payments, which is stimulative. Cutting rates is also inherently stimulative. The Fed is no longer controlling inflation but merely choosing the path through which it occurs.

According to BlackRock's CIO Rick Reeder, the critical metric for the economy isn't the Fed Funds Rate, but a stable 10-year Treasury yield. This stability lowers volatility in the mortgage market, which is far more impactful for real-world borrowing, corporate funding, and international investor confidence.

When government spending is massive ("fiscal dominance"), the Federal Reserve's ability to manage the economy via interest rates is neutralized. The government's deficit spending is so large that it dictates economic conditions, rendering rate cuts ineffective at solving structural problems.

The market is focused on potential rate cuts, but the true opportunity for credit investors is in the numerous corporate and real estate capital structures designed for a zero-rate world. These are unsustainable at today's normalized rates, meaning the full impact of past hikes is still unfolding.

The modern high-yield market is structurally different from its past. It's now composed of higher-quality issuers and has a shorter duration profile. While this limits potential upside returns compared to historical cycles, it also provides a cushion, capping the potential downside risk for investors.

The FOMC's recent rate cut marks the end of preemptive, "risk management" cuts designed to insure against potential future risks. Future policy changes will now be strictly reactive, depending on incoming economic data. This is a critical shift in the Fed's reaction function that changes the calculus for predicting future moves.

The reason for the Fed's rate cuts is critical. A "good" cycle with firm growth and declining inflation leads to strong commodity returns. Conversely, a "bad" cycle with decelerating growth and sticky inflation results in negative returns, making the 'why' more important than the 'what'.

For High-Yield Issuers, the 'Why' Behind Fed Rate Cuts Is More Damaging Than the 'What' | RiffOn