Out-of-court restructurings, or LMEs, introduce uncertainty into a company's capital structure. This forces the market to apply an additional 10-20 point discount to the trading price of the company's loans, creating a significant alpha-generating opportunity for specialized investors who can accurately underwrite the LME process.
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Identifying flawed investments, especially in opaque markets like private credit, is rarely about one decisive discovery. It involves assembling a 'mosaic' from many small pieces of information and red flags. This gradual build-up of evidence is what allows for an early, profitable exit before negatives become obvious to all.
Companies are willing to pay a 150-200 basis point premium for private credit to gain a strategic partner who provides bespoke financing, governance, and expertise for complex needs like carve-outs. This partnership value proposition distinguishes it from transactional public markets.
The classic distressed debt strategy is broken. Market dislocation windows are now incredibly narrow, often lasting just days. Furthermore, low interest rates for the past decade eliminated the ability to earn meaningful carry on discounted debt. This has forced distressed funds to rebrand as 'capital solutions' and focus on private, structured deals.
Aggressive Liability Management Exercises (LMEs), common in the US, are rarer in Europe. This isn't due to a gentler culture but stricter laws where board directors can face criminal charges for insolvency. This incentivizes collaborative restructuring over contentious, US-style creditor battles.
LMEs became popular because issuers could exploit out-of-court processes to their advantage, often by playing creditors against each other. As creditors have become more collaborative, this advantage has diminished, making LMEs less beneficial for issuers and likely capping their future frequency. Vanguard treats all LMEs as defaults.
While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.
A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.
The focus in distressed sovereign debt has shifted beyond country fundamentals. Investors are now performing deep analysis on novel state-contingent debt instruments created during recent restructurings in countries like Zambia and Sri Lanka, scrutinizing their complex trigger mechanisms and payout structures for alpha.
The market is focused on potential rate cuts, but the true opportunity for credit investors is in the numerous corporate and real estate capital structures designed for a zero-rate world. These are unsustainable at today's normalized rates, meaning the full impact of past hikes is still unfolding.
A credit investor's true edge lies not in understanding a company's operations, but in mastering the right-hand side of the balance sheet. This includes legal structures, credit agreements, and bankruptcy processes. Private equity investors, who are owners, will always have superior knowledge of the business itself (the left-hand side).