Focusing solely on military-style AI power grabs is too narrow. Extreme power concentration is more likely to emerge from a messy interplay of three factors: active seizures of control, massive economic shifts from automation, and the erosion of society's ability to understand reality (epistemics).

Guillaume Verdon argues that AI doomerism is often a deliberate weaponization of public anxiety. He believes certain actors use fear-mongering to justify seizing control over AI development, convincing the public they shouldn't have access to powerful models for their own good, thereby creating a dangerous cognitive gap.

The most immediate danger of AI is its potential for governmental abuse. Concerns focus on embedding political ideology into models and porting social media's censorship apparatus to AI, enabling unprecedented surveillance and social control.

While mitigating catastrophic AI risks is critical, the argument for safety can be used to justify placing powerful AI exclusively in the hands of a few actors. This centralization, intended to prevent misuse, simultaneously creates the monopolistic conditions for the Intelligence Curse to take hold.

Vitalik Buterin suggests that slowing AI progress to buy time for safety is a valid goal. He argues the most feasible and least dystopian method is to limit hardware production. Since chip manufacturing is already highly centralized, it presents a control point that avoids more invasive, freedom-restricting measures.

The narrative that AI could be catastrophic ('summoning the demon') is used strategically. It creates a sense of danger that justifies why a small, elite group must maintain tight control over the technology, thereby warding off both regulation and competition.

While a fast AI takeoff accelerates some risks, slower, more gradual AI progress still enables dangerous power concentration. Scenarios like a head of state subverting government AIs for personal loyalty or gradual economic disenfranchisement do not depend on a single company achieving a sudden, massive capability lead.

While often proposed to manage safety, a centralized, government-led AGI project is highly dangerous from a power concentration perspective. It removes checks and balances by consolidating immense capability within a single entity, whether it's one country or one company collaborating with the government.

The fundamental challenge of creating safe AGI is not about specific failure modes but about grappling with the immense power such a system will wield. The difficulty in truly imagining and 'feeling' this future power is a major obstacle for researchers and the public, hindering proactive safety measures. The core problem is simply 'the power.'