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Toto says after selling SMS.at, his CFO challenged the valuation: a tiny-revenue business with many users was priced absurdly next to a steel unit generating 30m EBIT. That skepticism led Toto to review nine investments and exit all before the dot-com crash. He credits that one-hour flight conversation with prompting the portfolio review.

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Cisco's stock took 25 years to reclaim its year-2000 peak, despite the underlying business growing significantly. This serves as a stark reminder that even a successful, growing company can deliver zero returns for decades if an investor buys in at an extremely high, bubble-era valuation.

Citing a quote from legendary investor Jim Breyer, Miles Clements emphasizes that while the science of VC is valuation, the art is knowing when to ignore it. He shares that Accel missed investing in ServiceTitan, a $9B company, by rigidly adhering to valuation multiples for vertical SaaS, learning a costly lesson about the need for flexibility with generational founders.

Toto says coming from a poor family made financial security a strong driver, and owning about 90% of his company meant he was not managing other people's money. A life-changing exit was easier to take; with fees and carry, he might have held on more aggressively. He says that changed his selling behavior.

By setting a low valuation for internal share transactions to help rising leaders, Huckabee's company was valued at a fraction of its true worth. An investment banker revealed it was worth 8 times more, highlighting how insulated founders can misjudge their market value without external expertise.

Growing up in dot-com epicenters, John Arrow saw companies with huge valuations fail because they only created the perception of value. This cautionary tale led him to bootstrap his own companies, focusing relentlessly on getting customers to actually buy things rather than chasing investors.

The founder consciously avoided raising at a high valuation, not just to prevent a future down round, but because he saw it as a source of immense psychological pressure. He felt this pressure would distract from solving hard, long-term problems, preferring a shorter runway to the mental burden of an inflated valuation.

During the dot-com boom, bullish investors pushed Renfrew's first company to expand its retail presence too quickly. When the market crashed and funding dried up, the company was "out over its skis" and forced into an unfavorable sale, a cautionary tale about unsustainable, investor-fueled growth.

When considering an exit, the primary risk isn't financial; it's the founder's time locked in a stagnating company. Spending productive years on a venture that's not working—even if well-funded—prevents a talented founder from pursuing the next big thing during a period of rapid technological change.

Zoom's stock has barely moved since its IPO, despite a 1700% increase in free cash flow. This serves as a stark reminder that even phenomenal business growth cannot generate investor returns if the initial purchase price was astronomically high. Valuation truly matters.

The quality of a business doesn't guarantee a good investment return. Companies like Cisco and Microsoft performed well as businesses after the 1999 bubble, but their stocks went nowhere for years because their initial valuations were too high. Investors must distinguish between the business and the stock.