The classic model is an entrepreneur raising equity, then seeking debt. Today, the market is flooded with capital mandated to provide debt, while equity providers are scarce. This inversion distorts economic development by prioritizing lending over genuine entrepreneurial risk-taking.
Related Insights
The US corporate market is 75% financed by capital markets, while Europe's is ~80% bank-financed. This structural inversion means Europe is undergoing a long-term, multi-decade shift toward institutional lending, creating a sustained tailwind for private credit growth that is far from mature.
Unlike prior tech revolutions funded mainly by equity, the AI infrastructure build-out is increasingly reliant on debt. This blurs the line between speculative growth capital (equity) and financing for predictable cash flows (debt), magnifying potential losses and increasing systemic failure risk if the AI boom falters.
While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.
A new risk is entering the AI capital stack: leverage. Entities are being created with high-debt financing (80% debt, 20% equity), creating 'leverage upon leverage.' This structure, combined with circular investments between major players, echoes the telecom bust of the late 90s and requires close monitoring.
Trillion-dollar tech companies are issuing massive bonds to fund AI CapEx, attracting immense demand from yield-hungry institutions. This 'hoovers' up available capital, making it harder and more expensive for smaller, middle-market businesses to secure financing and deepening the K-shaped economic divide.
China's economic structure, which funnels state-backed capital into sectors like EVs, inherently creates overinvestment and excess capacity. This distorted cost of capital leads to hyper-competitive industries, making it difficult for even successful companies to generate predictable, growing returns for shareholders.
The venture capital paradigm has inverted. Historically, private companies traded at an "illiquidity discount" to their public counterparts. Now, for elite companies, there is an "access premium" where investors pay more for private shares due to scarcity and hype. This makes staying private longer more attractive.
The system often blamed as capitalism is distorted. True capitalism requires the risk of failure as a clearing mechanism. Today's system is closer to cronyism, where government interventions like bailouts and regulatory capture protect established players from failure.
Enormous government borrowing is absorbing so much capital that it's crowding out corporate debt issuance, particularly for smaller businesses. This lack of new corporate supply leads to ironically tight credit spreads for large borrowers. This dynamic mirrors the intense concentration seen in public equity markets.
The trend of companies staying private longer and raising huge late-stage rounds isn't just about VC exuberance. It's a direct consequence of a series of regulations (like Sarbanes-Oxley) that made going public extremely costly and onerous. As a result, the private capital markets evolved to fill the gap, fundamentally changing venture capital.
