Leasing velocity in sectors like office and retail is improving as the market gains clarity. The vague "office apocalypse" story has been replaced by a more nuanced understanding that only 15-20% of office stock is truly obsolete. This certainty allows tenants and landlords to confidently make long-term leasing decisions again.

Unlike past cycles triggered by economic fundamentals like job losses, the recent CRE downturn was driven by capital markets (i.e., interest rate hikes). Because underlying property performance remained strong, lenders could confidently "extend and pretend," providing stability and preventing a catastrophic crash and broader economic contagion.

Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) that extended debt maturities a few years ago are proving to be temporary fixes, not cures. Many of these same companies are returning for "LME 2.0" because fundamental business issues—like weak consumer demand or high input costs—were never resolved, making the initial "kick the can" strategy ineffective.

Despite strong current performance driven by technicals, the real risk for leveraged loan issuers is their ability to refinance in 2-3 years. This looming "refinancing wall" could force many companies back into the high-yield market, creating a new wave of opportunities for credit investors.

Unlike past recessions where defaults spike and then recede, the current high-rate environment will keep financially weak 'zombie' companies struggling for longer. This leads to a sustained, elevated default rate rather than a sharp, temporary peak, as these firms lack the cash flow to grow or refinance.

Beyond the long-term threat of AI disruption, highly leveraged, lower-quality software companies funded by private credit face a more immediate problem: a $65 billion wall of debt maturing by 2028. They must refinance this debt amid high uncertainty, creating significant near-term risk separate from AI's eventual impact.

The CRE market successfully navigated a capital markets-driven downturn. It remains vulnerable to a stagflationary scenario where high inflation keeps interest rates elevated while weak growth erodes fundamentals (e.g., employment). This dual pressure would be disastrous, undermining the stability that has so far prevented a crash.

The popular narrative of a looming 'wall of maturities' is a fallacy used in investor presentations. Good companies proactively refinance their debt well ahead of time. It's only the poorly managed or fundamentally flawed businesses that are unable to refinance and face a maturity crisis, a fact the market quickly identifies.

The current rise in private credit stress isn't a sign of a broken market, but a predictable outcome. The massive volume of loans issued 3-5 years ago is now reaching the average time-to-default period, leading to an increase in troubled assets as a simple function of time and volume.