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Neumann reveals that "watcher" VCs on his board negotiated a $20B all-cash offer from SoftBank for seven months, greedily trying to get more. Their delay caused the deal to collapse when the market turned, vaporizing a massive exit for everyone involved.
An exit isn't just about founders and investors. It requires balancing the needs of at least seven groups: investors, the founder (as employee, creator, and supervisor), their family, the team, customers, and vendors. Satisfying one group often means making sacrifices with another.
UK software firm Craneware rejected a £26.50 per share takeover bid from Bain, arguing it undervalued the company. A year later, the stock trades at half that price. This serves as a stark warning to boards about the high risk of turning down significant premiums from acquirers.
A VC recounts advising founders to accept a massive acquisition offer during a market bubble, but they refused. Prioritizing his 'people-first' philosophy, he supported their decision to continue building. This choice ultimately cost the company, investors, and employees a potential $25-30 billion outcome when the market later corrected, highlighting a major conflict between financial optimization and founder support.
Initial lowball acquisition offers can feel defeating, forcing a founder to abandon the exit dream. This forces a necessary shift to building a sustainable, long-term business. This new focus, ironically, is what makes the company far more attractive to acquirers in the future.
Neumann pinpoints his downfall to a brief cab ride with Masayoshi Son. Securing a massive investment caused his ego to take over, shifting his focus from the mission to calculating his personal net worth. This single event corrupted the company's culture from the top down.
A key risk for undervalued companies is not just a low stock price, but being acquired via an unsolicited bid at a price that is still far below intrinsic value. Passive boards effectively gift value to acquirers by not proactively managing their company's valuation.
M&A opportunities are fleeting. The internal champion for a deal might leave or company priorities can shift dramatically, killing the opportunity. The OpenAI/TBPN deal likely wouldn't happen post-'Code Red'. Time and management turnover are the enemies of all deals, making it crucial to seize good offers.
A deal with two founders was about to sign when the less-committed founder hired an independent valuation firm. The firm provided an unrealistically high valuation, which he used as justification to kill the deal. Acquirers should address founder reluctance early, as emotional attachment can override a logical deal process.
The common advice to wait for an inbound acquisition offer is often pushed by VCs whose incentives are to chase massive, fund-returning exits. This advice misaligns with founders, who may benefit from a proactive selling process that secures a life-changing, albeit smaller, outcome.
After skillfully negotiating two offers and nearly doubling the price for SiteAdvisor, Chris Dixon felt he had maximized the deal. However, the acquiring CEO later revealed his board had authorized a price twice as high, a humbling lesson that a seller rarely knows the buyer's true willingness to pay.