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The primary vehicles for retail access, semi-liquid funds, offer limited quarterly liquidity (capped at ~5%). However, managers can impose "gates" to halt withdrawals entirely, exposing investors to a fundamental duration mismatch between their needs and the fund's illiquid assets.
To combat the misconception of easy access to cash, Goldman Sachs has internally banned the common industry term "semi-liquid" for its alternative funds. This linguistic shift is a deliberate risk management strategy to underscore that while these products have liquidity features, they are fundamentally illiquid and access to capital is never guaranteed.
Unlike public markets where assets can be sold (even at a loss), private assets are illiquid. The primary risk for retail investors is needing their capital for life events but being unable to access it due to fund lock-ups or redemption gates, a classic duration mismatch problem.
Private credit is being sold to retail investors through products that appear liquid like stocks but are not. These "semi-liquid" funds have clauses allowing them to halt redemptions during market stress, trapping investor capital precisely when they want it most, creating a "run-on-the-bank" panic.
The term "semi-liquid" for private asset funds is misleading. Retail investor behavior is procyclical; during a downturn, redemption requests will surge simultaneously. This reveals the assets' true illiquidity, turning a perceived feature into a systemic risk.
Goldman Sachs avoids the term "semi-liquid" because it provides false comfort. The liquidity gates on these evergreen funds are a feature, not a bug, designed to prevent fire-selling assets. They are most likely to be activated when investors are clamoring for redemptions.
Quarterly redemption limits in retail private credit funds, designed for stability, can have a perverse effect. To meet withdrawals, funds sell their most liquid and highest-quality loans first. This progressively worsens the quality of the remaining portfolio, potentially intensifying future redemption requests from concerned investors.
Permira's Ian Jackson argues that redemption limits in retail-oriented credit funds are working as intended to manage the mismatch between investor demand for liquidity and illiquid private loan portfolios.
Many investors in 'evergreen' or 'semi-liquid' funds like BDCs are surprised when they can't withdraw their money. These funds have redemption gates (e.g., only 5% of AUM per quarter) written into their documents, a detail often missed by investors rushing into the asset class without proper diligence.
Unlike liquid public market ETFs, new retail VC products have limitations on cashing out. AngelList's USVC targets a 5% quarterly redemption, but if they cannot meet it, investors are stuck, mirroring the illiquid nature of traditional venture capital.
While competitors rush to offer semi-liquid private equity funds to wealth clients, Apollo has deliberately abstained. They believe the illiquid nature of PE assets creates a profound liquidity mismatch with redemption features, risking a poor client experience in a prolonged downturn.