Unlike waiting for a natural collapse, the Bank of Japan's new governor in 1990 took deliberate action to end the speculative mania. By aggressively raising interest rates multiple times, he intentionally engineered the bubble's deflation, showing that central banks can be active agents in ending market excesses.

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The Bank of Japan's decision to hold rates, perceived as politically motivated, causes it to fall further "behind the curve" on inflation. This inaction could erode market confidence to the point where even future hawkish communications are ignored, suggesting the central bank is losing control of the market narrative.

The concept of "Nihonjuron," the theory of Japanese uniqueness, was used to rationalize extreme asset valuations that defied Western financial logic. This cultural narrative created a national blind spot, allowing investors to believe that traditional fundamentals didn't apply to Japan's seemingly superior economic system.

Former RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan points to a historical pattern preceding every major financial crisis: a U-shape in monetary policy. An extended period of easy money builds up risk, and the subsequent tightening phase triggers the collapse. This framework helps identify periods of heightened systemic vulnerability.

In 2026, major central banks will diverge significantly. The U.S. Fed and ECB are expected to cut rates in response to slowing growth and disinflation. In stark contrast, the Bank of Japan is poised to hike rates as it finally achieves reflation, making it the sole hawkish outlier among developed market central banks.

During the 1980s bubble, Japanese firms engaged in "Zytec," using profits from financial speculation to boost reported earnings. This created a circular feedback loop: rising share prices increased their ability to raise cheap capital for more speculation, which in turn fueled share prices even higher, detaching them from operational reality.

In a stark regional divergence, Japan is tightening its monetary policy while its Asian peers are easing. The Bank of Japan has raised rates to a 30-year high, and its government bond yields have surpassed China's. This counter-cyclical stance makes Japan a significant outlier in the Asia-Pacific economic landscape.

Despite Japan breaking its deflationary cycle, the Bank of Japan is hesitant to raise rates. The current inflation is primarily attributed to a weak yen and supply-side factors like energy costs, not robust consumer demand. With real consumption still below pre-COVID levels, the central bank remains cautious.

In today's hyper-financialized economy, central banks no longer need to actually buy assets to stop a crisis. The mere announcement of their willingness to act, like the Fed's 2020 corporate bond facility, is enough to restore market confidence as traders front-run the intervention.

The Takaichi government has a political incentive to support the Bank of Japan's monetary normalization. Allowing inflation and yen depreciation to continue unchecked could undermine consumer confidence and her high approval ratings. Therefore, a gradual BOJ rate hike could be seen as a politically astute move to maintain stability and popular support.

During its boom, Japan's industrial policy and close bank-firm relationships were admired as strengths. After the bubble burst, these same traits were immediately relabeled as crony capitalism and systemic flaws, showing how quickly dominant narratives about national economic models can invert.