Even if a startup creates perfect AI verification technology, it can't be used in a crisis until it's vetted by the intelligence community to become 'national technical means'—a process that historically takes years. Startups must engage with government agencies early to pre-vet their tech.

To prevent a reckless race, a proposed solution is a U.S.-China treaty to govern the resources needed for frontier AI. This would involve tracking and monitoring advanced AI chips in data centers and imposing a verifiable cap on the computational power used for any single training run.

As sovereign AI initiatives grow, the risk of an unchecked capabilities race increases. A shared language of evaluations could provide a "trust but verify" mechanism, akin to nuclear arms verification treaties. This allows nations to audit each other's AI for risks like runaway RSI, creating a basis for international policy.

Khosla asserts that international AI safety treaties are naive and impossible. Unlike nuclear or biotech, where usage can be verified, AI's deployment is covert. He argues that authoritarian states like China and Russia cannot be trusted to abide by agreements you cannot monitor, making such treaties ineffective and dangerous for the West.

China has a pre-existing regulatory body (CAC) and approval processes for AI models. While focused on content, this infrastructure can be extended to include cybersecurity tests, allowing for a more structured response to powerful new models compared to the US's reactive approach.

Any international or inter-company agreements to slow down AI development are impotent without the technology to verify compliance. The 'teeth' of any treaty or law will be technical verification tools, making their development a critical and urgent priority.

Emerging technologies like confidential computing offer a novel path to building trust between rivals. They could allow for mutual verification of AI systems or even sensitive government documents, with an AI providing trusted attestations (e.g., "no backdoor found") without exposing the underlying secret data.

Instead of an outright ban on models like China's Kimi K3, the US government is more likely to use "soft law" tactics. This involves pressuring chokepoints like US-based data centers and hyperscalers to restrict the hosting and deployment of these foreign models.

To ensure compliance with an AI slowdown treaty, new data centers could be built in neutral third-party countries (e.g., US centers in Mongolia, Chinese centers in Canada). This makes them physically vulnerable to seizure, creating a credible, though costly, deterrent against treaty violations.