As sovereign AI initiatives grow, the risk of an unchecked capabilities race increases. A shared language of evaluations could provide a "trust but verify" mechanism, akin to nuclear arms verification treaties. This allows nations to audit each other's AI for risks like runaway RSI, creating a basis for international policy.

Khosla asserts that international AI safety treaties are naive and impossible. Unlike nuclear or biotech, where usage can be verified, AI's deployment is covert. He argues that authoritarian states like China and Russia cannot be trusted to abide by agreements you cannot monitor, making such treaties ineffective and dangerous for the West.

Unlike nuclear weapons, which require rare materials like plutonium, AI relies on widely available silicon chips and public knowledge. The information to build large language models is accessible at an undergraduate level, making international treaties to pause or control AI development practically impossible to enforce.

In regulated industries like finance, the primary barrier to full AI automation is often regulation, not just user trust. It is the technology provider's responsibility to prove AI's reliability and safety to regulators, much like the industry did to legitimize e-signatures over a decade ago.

The debate over AI regulation often gets bogged down in technical complexity. A simpler, powerful argument is that nearly every other impactful technology—from cars and planes to food and medicine—requires pre-market safety validation. AI, with its greater potential risks, should be no different.

For companies deploying AI responsibly, independent verification is more than a cost; it's a strategic asset. A "green checkmark" from a trusted verifier acts as a competitive advantage and a growth lever by building essential consumer trust.

International AI treaties, particularly with nations like China, are unlikely to hold based on trust alone. A stable agreement requires a mutually-assured-destruction-style dynamic, meaning the U.S. must develop and signal credible offensive capabilities to deter cheating.

Claims that AI treaties are unverifiable lack imagination. During the Cold War, the US and USSR agreed to saw bombers in half on runways, allowing spy planes to visually confirm disarmament. Similar 'outside-the-box' physical verification methods, like publicly escrowing or destroying GPUs, could work for AI.

To accelerate enterprise AI adoption, vendors should achieve verifiable certifications like ISO 42001 (AI risk management). These standards provide a common language for procurement and security, reducing sales cycles by replacing abstract trust claims with concrete, auditable proof.