Chinese leadership might not be convinced by AI extinction risks. However, they might agree to a slowdown deal if they realize the US compute advantage is insurmountable in the short term. The deal offers them a chance to catch up on algorithms via transparency, avoiding a default loss.

To avoid being cut off from frontier AI, non-US countries can offer US hyperscalers incentives like subsidized energy for building data centers locally. In return, they can demand contractual guarantees for frontier model access, creating leverage against future US government-imposed restrictions.

The US and USSR, despite being adversaries, collaborated to prevent nuclear proliferation to rogue actors. A similar model can be applied to AI. The US and China share an interest in preventing powerful open-weight models from being used for cyber-attacks or bio-terrorism by third parties, creating a foundation for a safety dialogue.

To prevent a reckless race, a proposed solution is a U.S.-China treaty to govern the resources needed for frontier AI. This would involve tracking and monitoring advanced AI chips in data centers and imposing a verifiable cap on the computational power used for any single training run.

A global AI safety regime should learn from nuclear arms control by focusing on the physical infrastructure that enables strategic capabilities. Instead of just seeking promises, it should aim to control access to chokepoints like advanced chip manufacturing and the massive data centers required for frontier models.

The same governments pushing AI competition for a strategic edge may be forced into cooperation. As AI democratizes access to catastrophic weapons (CBRN), the national security risk will become so great that even rival superpowers will have a mutual incentive to create verifiable safety treaties.

International AI treaties, particularly with nations like China, are unlikely to hold based on trust alone. A stable agreement requires a mutually-assured-destruction-style dynamic, meaning the U.S. must develop and signal credible offensive capabilities to deter cheating.

Claims that AI treaties are unverifiable lack imagination. During the Cold War, the US and USSR agreed to saw bombers in half on runways, allowing spy planes to visually confirm disarmament. Similar 'outside-the-box' physical verification methods, like publicly escrowing or destroying GPUs, could work for AI.

An AI development deal could paradoxically make a future intelligence race more dangerous by allowing for a massive buildup of compute infrastructure. A key principle of "Plan A" is that if the deal collapses, any compute built during the deal must be destroyed, returning the world to its pre-deal strategic balance.