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A core financial mistake for Late July was assuming their crackers would have the same purchase frequency (velocity) as potato chips. This miscalculation threw off their entire business model, proving that velocity is a make-or-break metric for any CPG brand.
For a business with unpredictable demand spikes, like team-based sales for sports gear, long-term inventory forecasting is unreliable. Instead, focus on analyzing sell-through rates over short windows (30, 60, 90 days) to make more agile and accurate reordering decisions.
The tension between growth and profitability is best resolved by understanding your product's "runway" (be it 6 months or 6 years). This single piece of information, often misaligned between teams and leadership, should dictate your strategic focus. The key task is to uncover this true runway.
When Daniel Lubetzky saw zero sales at Walmart, he assumed the product was a failure. He later realized it often meant the product was stuck in the backroom and never made it to shelves. This highlights the critical difference between a product problem and a logistics problem in CPG.
Securing a deal with a giant like Walmart can be a trap. If the product doesn't sell through immediately, the brand is forced into massive, unplanned promotional spending to stay on shelves. This depletes cash and starts a downward spiral that many CPG startups don't survive.
For new CPG products, a methodical go-to-market approach that builds momentum in one strategic channel before expanding is superior to a wide, initial push. This creates a steady, predictable growth curve and avoids massive spikes and crashes in demand and production.
Before launching, assess a product's viability by the sheer number of potential distribution points. Manufacturing and logistics are solvable problems if the market access is vast. This reverses the typical product-first approach by prioritizing market penetration from day one.
Consumer Packaged Goods (CPG) companies drove revenue through price increases, but this came at the cost of falling volumes. By pushing prices closer to the perceived value, they eliminated the "consumer surplus"—the extra value a customer feels they get. This made private label alternatives more attractive and damaged long-term brand relevance.
Late July was stagnating in the small cracker category. The life-saving pivot was into the enormous, hyper-competitive tortilla chip category. This contradicts the common advice to 'own a niche,' showing that sometimes growth requires entering a bigger, tougher market.
The founder of Late July asserts from experience that the most difficult scaling period for a CPG brand is the leap from $10 million to $50 million. This phase requires a different level of operational rigor and strategy than the initial startup phase or scaling beyond.
Late July debuted at a trade show and left with huge orders, appearing to be a national brand overnight. However, sales collapsed two months later because end consumers weren't ready. This proves retailer excitement doesn't always translate to consumer demand.