Evaluating export controls by asking if China is still advancing is the wrong metric. The true test is the counterfactual: where would China be *without* the restrictions? The controls act as a significant handicap in a competitive race, not a complete stop, and it's highly likely China would be ahead of the U.S. in AI without them.
Related Insights
The decision to allow NVIDIA to sell powerful AI chips to China has a counterintuitive goal. The administration believes that by supplying China, it can "take the air out" of the country's own efforts to build a self-sufficient AI chip ecosystem, thereby hindering domestic firms like Huawei.
Restricting sales to China is a catastrophic mistake that creates a protected, trillion-dollar market for domestic rivals like Huawei. This funds their R&D and global expansion with monopoly profits. To win the long-term AI race, American tech must be allowed to compete everywhere.
The most dangerous policy mistake would be reverting to a 'sliding scale' that allows China to buy chips that are a few generations behind the cutting edge. In the current era of AI, performance is aggregatable. China could simply purchase massive quantities of these slightly older chips to achieve compute power equivalent to frontier systems.
A major, clandestine production run by TSMC for Huawei shell companies supplied China with millions of advanced AI chips. This single violation artificially propped up China's AI compute capacity, effectively delaying the full impact of U.S. export controls by two years and obscuring the true state of China's domestic capabilities.
Instead of crippling China, aggressive US sanctions and tech restrictions are having the opposite effect. They have forced China to accelerate its own domestic R&D and manufacturing for advanced technologies like microchips. This is creating a more powerful and self-sufficient competitor that will not be reliant on the West.
Restricting allies like the UAE from buying U.S. AI chips is a counterproductive policy. It doesn't deny them access to AI; it pushes them to purchase Chinese alternatives like Huawei. This strategy inadvertently builds up China's market share and creates a global technology ecosystem centered around a key U.S. competitor.
Contrary to their intent, U.S. export controls on AI chips have backfired. Instead of crippling China's AI development, the restrictions provided the necessary incentive for China to aggressively invest in and accelerate its own semiconductor industry, potentially eroding the U.S.'s long-term competitive advantage.
China's superior ability to rapidly build energy infrastructure and data centers means it could have outpaced US firms in building massive AI training facilities. Export controls are the primary reason Chinese hyperscalers haven't matched the massive capital spending of their US counterparts.
The argument that U.S. export controls accelerate China's domestic tech efforts is a fiction. China's "indigenization pedal has been on the floor" since 2014, long before recent controls were implemented. It is a core national priority, meaning U.S. policy has little marginal effect on an already maxed-out effort.
U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors, intended to slow China, have instead galvanized its domestic industry. The restrictions accelerated China's existing push for self-sufficiency, forcing local companies to innovate with less advanced chips and develop their own GPU and manufacturing capabilities, diminishing the policy's long-term effectiveness.
