China's primary strategic goal is to be the leading power in East Asia and the Western Pacific. While it lacks a current plan for global domination, its appetite could grow with success, and controlling this economically vital region provides a de facto form of global preeminence.

The United States' greatest strategic advantage over competitors like China is its vast ecosystem of over 50 wealthy, advanced, allied nations. China has only one treaty ally: North Korea. Weakening these alliances through punitive actions is a critical foreign policy error that erodes America's primary source of global strength.

To manage global shifts, Alexander Stubb advocates for reforming institutions like the UN Security Council to give rising nations more power. This strategy aims to secure their buy-in for a rules-based system, arguing it's more stable than building separate alliances of middle powers outside of existing frameworks.

The current international system isn't merely a contest between the US and China. Middle and even small powers like Turkey, Brazil, and Singapore are actively pursuing "strategic autonomy" and recrafting foreign policy, creating a more complex, diffuse web of competition across the globe.

Finland's president explains that the US can entertain a "multipolar" world of transactional deals because of its immense power. In contrast, smaller nations like Finland depend on a "multilateral," rules-based order for their security and prosperity. For them, multilateralism is not a choice but a geopolitical necessity.

While a unipolar world led by one's own country is advantageous, a multipolar world with competing powers like the U.S. and China creates a dynamic tension. This competition may force more compromised global decisions, potentially leading to a more balanced, albeit more tense, international system than one dominated by a single unchallenged power.

Russia, as a commodity superpower, profits from the instability that drives up oil and gas prices. Conversely, China's economic model depends on integrated global markets and trade. This fundamental difference in core interests presents a strategic opportunity for the West to drive a wedge between the two powers.

Middle powers like India are not picking a side but are 'multi-aligned,' partnering with the US on tech, Russia on arms, and China on other initiatives. This creates a fluid, complex system of shifting, issue-specific coalitions rather than two fixed blocs.

China concentrates its diplomatic and military resources on regions crucial to its core interests—its immediate neighbors like Taiwan and Japan. This long-standing "periphery diplomacy" explains its choice to use economic leverage, rather than direct intervention, in more distant conflicts like Iran.