Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The increase in Payment-In-Kind (PIK) debt to 15-25% of BDC portfolios is not a sign of innovative structuring. Instead, it often results from "amend and extend" processes where weakened companies can no longer afford cash interest payments. This "zombification" signals underlying credit deterioration.

LMEs became popular because issuers could exploit out-of-court processes to their advantage, often by playing creditors against each other. As creditors have become more collaborative, this advantage has diminished, making LMEs less beneficial for issuers and likely capping their future frequency. Vanguard treats all LMEs as defaults.

Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) that extended debt maturities a few years ago are proving to be temporary fixes, not cures. Many of these same companies are returning for "LME 2.0" because fundamental business issues—like weak consumer demand or high input costs—were never resolved, making the initial "kick the can" strategy ineffective.

Unlike syndicated loans where non-payment is a clear default, private credit has a "third state" where lenders accept PIK interest on underperforming loans. When this "bad PIK" is correctly categorized as a default, the sector's true default rate is significantly higher, around 5% versus 3% for syndicated loans.

Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.

Lenders allow struggling borrowers to skip cash interest payments by adding the amount to the loan's principal balance. This practice, called 'Payment in Kind' (PIK), hides defaults, artificially inflates asset values, and creates a deceptively low official default rate, masking escalating risk within the system.

Unlike past recessions where defaults spike and then recede, the current high-rate environment will keep financially weak 'zombie' companies struggling for longer. This leads to a sustained, elevated default rate rather than a sharp, temporary peak, as these firms lack the cash flow to grow or refinance.

After a decade of abnormally low defaults, the credit market is experiencing a return to normal levels, driven by rate hikes and inflation. PGIM sees this not as an alarming trend but as an expected normalization for single-B assets, especially as the broader economy remains resilient.