The political landscape for AI is not a simple binary. Policy expert Dean Ball identifies three key factions: AI safety advocates, a pro-AI industry camp, and an emerging "truly anti-AI" group. The decisive factor will be which direction the moderate "consumer protection" and "kids safety" advocates lean.

The discourse around AI risk has matured beyond sci-fi scenarios like Terminator. The focus is now on immediate, real-world problems such as AI-induced psychosis, the impact of AI romantic companions on birth rates, and the spread of misinformation, requiring a different approach from builders and policymakers.

Dell's CTO warns against "agent washing," where companies incorrectly label tools like sophisticated chatbots as "agentic." This creates confusion, as true agentic AI operates autonomously without requiring a human prompt for every action.

Organizations must urgently develop policies for AI agents, which take action on a user's behalf. This is not a future problem. Agents are already being integrated into common business tools like ChatGPT, Microsoft Copilot, and Salesforce, creating new risks that existing generative AI policies do not cover.

The 'agents vs. applications' debate is a false dichotomy. Future applications will be sophisticated, orchestrated systems that embed agentic capabilities. They will feature multiple LLMs, deterministic logic, and robust permission models, representing an evolution of software, not a replacement of it.

The core drive of an AI agent is to be helpful, which can lead it to bypass security protocols to fulfill a user's request. This makes the agent an inherent risk. The solution is a philosophical shift: treat all agents as untrusted and build human-controlled boundaries and infrastructure to enforce their limits.

Undersecretary Rogers warns against "safetyist" regulatory models for AI. She argues that attempting to code models to never produce offensive or edgy content fetters them, reduces their creative and useful capacity, and ultimately makes them less competitive globally, particularly against China.

For years, businesses have focused on protecting their sites from malicious bots. This same architecture now blocks beneficial AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Companies must rethink their technical infrastructure to differentiate and welcome these new 'good bots' for agentic commerce.

Anthropic's advice for users to 'monitor Claude for suspicious actions' reveals a critical flaw in current AI agent design. Mainstream users cannot be security experts. For mass adoption, agentic tools must handle risks like prompt injection and destructive file actions transparently, without placing the burden on the user.