The romantic notion that the US can rapidly pivot its industrial base for war is a misleading myth. Today's weapons are vastly more complex and reliant on fragile global supply chains for components that are controlled by adversaries, making a WWII-style industrial mobilization impossible without years of preparation.

The U.S. Navy's ability to track Soviet submarines while keeping its own hidden threatened the USSR's second-strike capability, the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. This technological and financial asymmetry pushed the Soviets toward de-escalation and ultimately, ending the war.

For 30 years, China identified rare earths as a strategic industry. By massively subsidizing its own companies and dumping product to crash prices, it methodically drove US and global competitors out of business, successfully creating a coercive dependency for the rest of the world.

The shift to a less adversarial China policy may be a strategic maneuver to avoid supply chain disruptions. The U.S. appears to be biding its time—likely for 5+ years—to wean itself off dependence on Chinese rare earth minerals, which are critical for both industry and defense manufacturing.

The US won World War II largely due to its unparalleled manufacturing capacity. Today, that strategic advantage has been ceded to China. In a potential conflict, the US would face an adversary that mirrors its own historical strength, creating a critical national security vulnerability.

The 40-year plateau in nuclear power wasn't driven by public fear after incidents like Chernobyl, but by the soaring costs of building massive, one-off reactors. The modern push for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) aims to solve this fundamental economic problem through factory-based production.

In the 1970s, France built 57 reactors in 15 years through its government-led utility, which repeatedly built the same design. In contrast, the US's fragmented private utility system, with each company building different designs, failed to achieve similar cost reductions and scale.

The U.S. has the same 1.2 terawatts of power capacity it had in 1985. This stagnation now poses a national security risk, as the country must double its capacity to support AI data centers and reshoring manufacturing. The Department of Energy views solving this as a "Manhattan Project 2.0" level imperative.

The same fear-based arguments and political forces that halted nuclear fission are now re-emerging to block fusion. Ironically, the promise of a future fusion 'savior' is being used as another excuse to prevent the deployment of existing, proven zero-emission fission technology today.