Michael Burry, known for predicting the 2008 crash, argues the AI bubble isn't about the technology's potential but about the massive capital expenditure on infrastructure (chips, data centers) that he believes far outpaces actual end-user demand and economic utility.
OpenAI's CFO hinted at needing government guarantees for its massive data center build-out, sparking fears of an AI bubble and a "too big to fail" scenario. This reveals the immense financial risk and growing economic dependence the U.S. is developing on a few key AI labs.
Despite bubble fears, Nvidia’s record earnings signal a virtuous cycle. The real long-term growth is not just from model training but from the coming explosion in inference demand required for AI agents, robotics, and multimodal AI integrated into every device and application.
Current AI investment patterns mirror the "round-tripping" seen in the late '90s tech bubble. For example, NVIDIA invests billions in a startup like OpenAI, which then uses that capital to purchase NVIDIA chips. This creates an illusion of demand and inflated valuations, masking the lack of real, external customer revenue.
History shows that transformative innovations like airlines, vaccines, and PCs, while beneficial to society, often fail to create sustained, concentrated shareholder value as they become commoditized. This suggests the massive valuations in AI may be misplaced, with the technology's benefits accruing more to users than investors in the long run.
Unlike the speculative "dark fiber" buildout of the dot-com bubble, today's AI infrastructure race is driven by real, immediate, and overwhelming demand. The problem isn't a lack of utilization for built capacity; it's a constant struggle to build supply fast enough to meet customer needs.
The exceptionally low cost of developing and operating AI models in China is forcing a reckoning in the US tech sector. American investors and companies are now questioning the high valuations and expensive operating costs of their domestic AI, creating fear that the US AI boom is a bubble inflated by high costs rather than superior technology.
While the AI capex boom may seem unsustainable, the mechanics of shorting it (e.g., buying puts) reveal the extreme difficulty of the trade. The bet requires being correct not just on the eventual downturn but on its precise timing. The risk of losing the entire premium makes it an unattractive risk-adjusted bet.
Current AI spending appears bubble-like, but it's not propping up unprofitable operations. Inference is already profitable. The immense cash burn is a deliberate, forward-looking investment in developing future, more powerful models, not a sign of a failing business model. This re-frames the financial risk.
The AI market won't just pop; it will unwind in a specific sequence. Traditional companies will first scale back AI investment, which reveals OpenAI's inability to fund massive chip purchases. This craters NVIDIA's stock, triggering a multi-trillion-dollar market destruction and leading to a broader economic recession.
The AI infrastructure boom is a potential house of cards. A single dollar of end-user revenue paid to a company like OpenAI can become $8 of "seeming revenue" as it cascades through the value chain to Microsoft, CoreWeave, and NVIDIA, supporting an unsustainable $100 of equity market value.