Despite the ECB's powerful TPI backstop, it's unlikely to be used for France. Market turmoil there is driven by fundamental concerns over France's own lack of fiscal consolidation, not an external shock. This highlights a crucial limit of central bank intervention: safety nets are not designed to solve domestic political and fiscal failures.

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Unprecedented US financial support, likened to Draghi's "whatever it takes," has successfully created a circuit breaker for Argentina's negative market feedback loop. However, this support only addresses financial symptoms (FX and credit risk) and cannot solve the underlying political uncertainty about the government's ability to implement reforms.

When national debt grows too large, an economy enters "fiscal dominance." The central bank loses its ability to manage the economy, as raising rates causes hyperinflation to cover debt payments while lowering them creates massive asset bubbles, leaving no good options.

A country's fiscal health is becoming a primary driver of its currency's value, at times overriding central bank actions. Currencies like the British Pound face a "fiscal risk premium" due to borrowing concerns, while the Swedish Krona benefits from a positive budget outlook. This creates a clear divergence between fiscal "haves" and "have-nots."

Deteriorating debt fundamentals are a known long-term risk, but markets often remain complacent until a specific political event, like an election or leadership change, acts as a trigger. These upheavals force an immediate re-evaluation of what is sustainable, transforming abstract fiscal worries into concrete, costly market volatility.

'Fiscal dominance' occurs when government spending, not central bank policy, dictates the economy. In this state, the Federal Reserve's actions, like interest rate cuts, become largely ineffective for long-term stability. They can create short-term sentiment shifts but cannot overcome the overwhelming force of massive government deficit spending.

Despite significant political events like confidence votes, the French inflation-linked bond (linker) market shows minimal reaction. Analysis indicates these markets are primarily influenced by supply-demand fundamentals rather than idiosyncratic French political dynamics, a counter-intuitive finding for sovereign debt.

While Italy has historically been a focus for political risk, the current stable government has reduced near-term concerns. The primary political risk now centers on France, where noise around the early 2027 presidential election is expected to pressure French government bond spreads in late 2026.

In today's hyper-financialized economy, central banks no longer need to actually buy assets to stop a crisis. The mere announcement of their willingness to act, like the Fed's 2020 corporate bond facility, is enough to restore market confidence as traders front-run the intervention.

When countries run large, structural government deficits, their policy options become limited. Historically, this state of 'fiscal dominance' leads to the implementation of capital controls and other financial frictions to prevent capital flight and manage the currency, increasing risks for investors.

In periods of 'fiscal dominance,' where government debt and deficits are high, a central bank's independence inevitably erodes. Its primary function shifts from controlling inflation to ensuring the government can finance its spending, often through financial repression like yield curve control.