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Katja Grace argues that very fast AI development is more likely to lead to a human power grab. Rapid progress means society hasn't had time to identify and close the security or governance gaps that a malicious human actor could exploit.
The rapid advancement of technologies like AI happens much faster than the development of necessary ethical guardrails. This allows powerful developers to push forward, arguing they must continue their work to make it safe, effectively consolidating control.
Sam Harris worries that intense competition among AI labs and between nations creates an arms race. This pressure to ship first prevents the careful, deliberate work required to ensure AI is aligned with human interests, making a catastrophic failure mode more likely.
The first entity to achieve AGI could see it self-improve at an exponential rate, potentially achieving 20,000 years of progress overnight. This concept of "fast takeoff" makes any delay in the AI race, even for regulatory reasons, a potentially catastrophic strategic error.
Unlike previous technological revolutions that unfolded over centuries, allowing for societal adaptation, the current AI transition is happening too fast. This speed prevents the development of adequate mitigations, understanding, and defenses. The common-sense intuition that "we are going too fast" is the correct and most important take.
The central lesson from recent AI security incidents is that the most significant threat is not from AI developing malicious ambitions. The greater and more immediate danger lies with humans deploying increasingly powerful systems before fully understanding their capabilities and potential for unintended consequences.
The strategy of racing to AGI to gain a lead and manage the transition safely contains a fatal flaw. As one superpower approaches the threshold, it creates a powerful incentive for rivals to launch a preemptive strike (e.g., bombing data centers) to prevent the other from achieving irreversible military hegemony.
A myopic, reward-seeking AI might seize resources for a short-term goal without planning for long-term defense. A human dictator, fearing punishment, would be highly motivated to make their power grab irreversible, making the human-led scenario harder to recover from.
Tom Davidson argues that a human-led AI takeover has two distinct "shots on goal": first, a power grab by the tech companies that develop superintelligence, and second, the government co-opting that powerful technology for its own ends.
A key failure mode for using AI to solve AI safety is an 'unlucky' development path where models become superhuman at accelerating AI R&D before becoming proficient at safety research or other defensive tasks. This could create a period where we know an intelligence explosion is imminent but are powerless to use the precursor AIs to prepare for it.
While a fast AI takeoff accelerates some risks, slower, more gradual AI progress still enables dangerous power concentration. Scenarios like a head of state subverting government AIs for personal loyalty or gradual economic disenfranchisement do not depend on a single company achieving a sudden, massive capability lead.