Large banks have offloaded riskier loans to private credit, which is now more accessible to retail investors. According to Crossmark's Victoria Fernandez, this concentration of risk in a less transparent market, where "cockroaches" may be hiding, is a primary systemic concern.

Today's market structure, dominated by High-Frequency Trading (HFT) firms, is inherently fragile. HFTs provide liquidity during calm periods but are incentivized to withdraw it during stress, creating "liquidity voids." This amplifies price dislocations and increases systemic risk, making large-cap concentration more dangerous than it appears.

According to PIMCO's CIO, post-crisis regulation heavily targets the last failure point (e.g., banks and consumer lending post-GFC). This makes previously regulated sectors safer while risk migrates to areas that escaped scrutiny, like today's non-financial corporate credit market.

The SVB crisis wasn't a traditional bank run caused by bad loans. It was the first instance where the speed of the internet and digital fund transfers outpaced regulatory reaction, turning a manageable asset-liability mismatch into a systemic crisis. This highlights a new type of technological 'tail risk' for modern banking.

Silicon Valley Bank was already a member of deposit networks that could have prevented its collapse. However, 94% of its deposits remained uninsured because the bank failed to actually use the tools at its disposal. This reveals that the mere existence of a solution is worthless without proper implementation, integration, and incentives for adoption within an organization.

While private crypto has scams, the true systemic risk is Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). Being programmable and centralized, they give governments the power to monitor, block, and control every citizen's transactions, creating an infrastructure for authoritarian control under the guise of progress.

The greatest systemic threat from the booming private credit market isn't excessive leverage but its heavy concentration in technology companies. A significant drop in tech enterprise value multiples could trigger a widespread event, as tech constitutes roughly half of private credit portfolios.

Unlike the 2008 crisis, which was concentrated in housing and banking, today's risk is an 'everything bubble.' A decade of cheap money has simultaneously inflated stocks, real estate, crypto, and even collectibles, meaning a collapse would be far broader and more contagious.

The current crypto environment mirrors the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis. 'Good money is chasing after many intrinsically weak assets,' which are then complexly leveraged and integrated into the balance sheets of systemically important institutions, creating a growing, underappreciated systemic risk.