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A private equity fund attempted to lower valuation and alter agreed terms by two percent one week before signing a billion-dollar transaction. The sellers walked away feeling disrespected, costing the fund an asset that subsequently boomed under another buyer.
When a $2 million ARR deal with a key customer fell through mid-diligence, the buyer didn't just adjust the valuation linearly. They attempted an opportunistic 50% price cut, using the news to reset the entire negotiation and test the seller's resolve.
When A16Z allegedly lowered its verbal offer for Uber's Series B, Travis Kalanick had to go back to all other interested investors. This caused a loss of credibility and momentum, making the process "super awkward and weird" and forcing a complete reset of the auction.
When an executive unexpectedly offers a last-minute discount, it signals desperation and inconsistency. The buyer, instead of closing, starts wondering what other concessions they could get, slowing down the deal and undermining the sales rep's credibility.
In M&A, some private equity firms use prolonged diligence to exhaust founders, then change key deal terms at the last minute. They bet the founder is too worn down to walk away from a worse offer, a tactic Ryan Levesque calls a "dick move" that he successfully rejected.
Accepting too high a valuation can be a fatal error. The first question in any subsequent fundraising or M&A discussion will be about the prior round's price. An unjustifiably high number immediately destroys the psychology of the new deal, making it nearly impossible to raise more capital or sell the company, regardless of progress.
In M&A, the closer you get to closing, the more emotionally invested you become, even mentally spending the money. This attachment makes founders vulnerable to accepting last-minute unfavorable changes because they've already "emotionally bought in" and moved on from owning the company.
A common but destructive tactic is "nibbling"—asking for small extras after an agreement is reached. While it may secure minor concessions, it leaves the other party feeling cheated, which can jeopardize future business and even their willingness to fully comply with the current deal's terms.
A deal with two founders was about to sign when the less-committed founder hired an independent valuation firm. The firm provided an unrealistically high valuation, which he used as justification to kill the deal. Acquirers should address founder reluctance early, as emotional attachment can override a logical deal process.
When Harmon International agreed to be sold to Samsung for a price Roepers felt was too low, he didn't just sell. His fund perfected its appraisal rights by voting against the merger, allowing them to legally challenge the valuation and negotiate a higher price from the buyer post-close.
Two founders rejected a $20M acquisition offer they felt was too low. After successfully pivoting their business during the pandemic, they returned to the same buyer and received a doubled offer of $40M with better terms. This shows how patience and focusing on business performance can dramatically improve an exit outcome.