The Carter administration was explicitly warned by its own diplomats that allowing the deposed Shah into the US would provoke an attack on the Tehran embassy. Carter, aware of the risk, ultimately relented due to humanitarian pressure and political concerns about appearing disloyal.

Instead of viewing the crisis as an immediate disaster, some in Carter's re-election team saw it as an opportunity. They believed it would allow Carter to "wrap himself in the flag" and appear presidential, a strategy that catastrophically backfired as the crisis dragged on.

Carter's acceptance of full blame for the failed Iran hostage rescue mission deeply impressed its military commander, Colonel Beckwith. This act showcased a form of leadership that transcends operational success, countering the public perception of him as a weak leader.

Days before Iran's 1978 revolution, President Jimmy Carter lauded the Shah's leadership and Iran's "stability." This highlights a catastrophic failure of intelligence and a reliance on superficial state-level relationships over understanding ground-level dissent.

The U.S. Embassy and CIA were unaware that the Shah was dying of leukemia, dismissing rumors as Russian propaganda. This critical intelligence gap meant they couldn't understand his indecisiveness and erratic behavior as the crisis escalated, misreading the entire situation.

In a final act of humiliation, Iranian authorities delayed the hostages' release until the very moment Ronald Reagan finished his inaugural address. This ensured Jimmy Carter, who had obsessed over their freedom, was a private citizen, denying him his final presidential goal.

The shutdown of Iranian oil fields caused global prices to surge, leading to gas lines and high inflation in the US. This economic pain, more than the foreign policy failure itself, crippled Jimmy Carter's presidency by translating a distant revolution into a tangible, politically toxic domestic issue.

The White House assumed the hostage crisis was a negotiation over specific demands, such as returning the Shah. In reality, Khomeini used the prolonged crisis to eliminate moderate rivals and consolidate the Islamic Republic, making the stated demands largely irrelevant.

The Shah believed the US was masterminding events in Iran, a comforting illusion that someone was in control. The reality—that the US government was paralyzed by indecision and had no plan—was far more terrifying. This realization shattered his confidence and sealed his fate.