Clinton contends that managing the risks of AI requires more than national regulation. She calls for a global diplomatic effort to create treaties and covenants, uniting nations to establish rules and standards that tech companies cannot individually circumvent.

To prevent a reckless race, a proposed solution is a U.S.-China treaty to govern the resources needed for frontier AI. This would involve tracking and monitoring advanced AI chips in data centers and imposing a verifiable cap on the computational power used for any single training run.

The idea of nations collectively creating policies to slow AI development for safety is naive. Game theory dictates that the immense competitive advantage of achieving AGI first will drive nations and companies to race ahead, making any global regulatory agreement effectively unenforceable.

Unlike nuclear weapons, AI is too complex and fast-moving to be managed by formal treaties alone. True safety requires 'organic transparency,' where rich economic, cultural, and scientific engagement between nations builds the trust and informal oversight necessary to prevent catastrophe.

A global AI safety regime should learn from nuclear arms control by focusing on the physical infrastructure that enables strategic capabilities. Instead of just seeking promises, it should aim to control access to chokepoints like advanced chip manufacturing and the massive data centers required for frontier models.

Unlike nuclear weapons, which require rare materials like plutonium, AI relies on widely available silicon chips and public knowledge. The information to build large language models is accessible at an undergraduate level, making international treaties to pause or control AI development practically impossible to enforce.

The belief that AI development is unstoppable ignores history. Global treaties successfully limited nuclear proliferation, phased out ozone-depleting CFCs, and banned blinding lasers. These precedents prove that coordinated international action can steer powerful technologies away from the worst outcomes.

The popular comparison of AI to nuclear weapons has a critical flaw. Nuclear regulation relies on tracking scarce, physical, and interceptable fissionable materials. AI, as software and weights, can be copied and distributed far more easily, making the nuclear non-proliferation playbook a poor and dangerous model for AI governance.

International AI treaties, particularly with nations like China, are unlikely to hold based on trust alone. A stable agreement requires a mutually-assured-destruction-style dynamic, meaning the U.S. must develop and signal credible offensive capabilities to deter cheating.