The Supreme Court's authority to declare laws unconstitutional—its main function today—is not explicitly mentioned in Article 3. This power of judicial review was established by the Court itself in the early 19th century, fundamentally shaping its role in the U.S. government's balance of powers.

Congress can alter the number of Supreme Court justices and even limit the types of cases the court can hear—a power known as "jurisdiction stripping"—through simple legislation. Despite this authority, a deep-seated political norm has prevented Congress from exercising it aggressively, leaving its full constitutional extent untested.

The over 12,000 failed attempts to amend the Constitution are not just legislative footnotes; they constitute a meaningful archive of what the American people have wanted from their government but were unable to achieve, offering a people's history of constitutional desires.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened primarily because the Articles of Confederation required unanimous consent for amendments. This allowed a single state, 'Rogue' Rhode Island, to repeatedly block necessary changes, proving the system was unworkable and necessitating a complete replacement.

Contrary to popular belief, Article 3 of the Constitution provides a sparse blueprint for the federal judiciary. It establishes "one Supreme Court" but delegates the creation of lower courts and even the Supreme Court's size to congressional legislation, making the judiciary's structure far more flexible than assumed.

Janet Napolitano argues that recent Supreme Court doctrines presume a level of legislative clarity and capability that doesn't exist in modern politics. By expecting Congress to legislate with extreme precision on all major issues, the Court ignores institutional dysfunction and creates a standard the legislative branch cannot meet.

Viewing the Roberts Court as a single, unbroken entity is misleading. Its early phase was a 5-4 court where Justice Kennedy often sided with liberals, creating a sense of balance. His retirement and the appointment of three Trump justices created a new, more predictably conservative and lopsided era.

In the 1970s, as Article V became politically gridlocked for both parties, conservatives developed originalism. It allowed them to pursue constitutional change from the bench under the guise of 'restoration,' bypassing the defunct formal amendment route.

Historian Anne Applebaum observes that significant US constitutional amendments often follow profound national traumas like the Revolution or the Civil War. This suggests that without a similar large-scale crisis, mustering the collective will to address deep-seated issues like systemic corruption is historically difficult, as there is no single moment of reckoning.