The students who seized the US Embassy did not plan a 444-day ordeal. Their original plan was a brief, symbolic occupation to protest US policy, inspired by Western student sit-ins. They brought only enough food for three days, showing their lack of foresight for the crisis's escalation.

Kicked out of Iraq, Khomeini landed in Paris. This unexpected move gave him unprecedented access to the world's press, turning him into an international figure and allowing him to broadcast his revolutionary message globally, which was crucial for his success.

While appearing as a traditionalist, Khomeini's core concept, the "Guardianship of the Jurist," was a profound theological revolution. It proposed for the first time that clerics should directly rule the state, breaking with centuries of Shiite political quietism. This innovation provided the ideological basis for the new republic.

The ruling elite has inverted from 80% ideologues at the revolution's start to 80% charlatans today. Expedience and financial gain, not revolutionary zeal, now bind the regime's core. This ideological hollowness makes the regime more brittle than its rhetoric suggests.

The Iranian Revolution was fueled by a Shia worldview centered on martyrdom, cosmic struggle between good and evil, and an apocalyptic final battle. U.S. policymakers, lacking any understanding of this religious framework, were completely unprepared for its political power.

Iran's leader was surprised by the student takeover and first ordered them out. He quickly changed his mind upon realizing the event's immense popularity and its utility in consolidating hardline control, demonstrating his political opportunism over ideological consistency.

Prominent Western left-wing intellectuals were initially supportive of Ayatollah Khomeini. They were drawn to his anti-imperialist rhetoric about "the disinherited of the earth," mistakenly projecting their own ideals onto him and predicting he would usher in a "humane" form of governance.

The concept of an "Islamic government" was deliberately left undefined. This vagueness allowed various anti-Shah groups—from secular liberals to Marxists—to project their own hopes onto the revolution, creating a broad but fragile coalition. The lack of detail was a feature, not a bug.

The White House assumed the hostage crisis was a negotiation over specific demands, such as returning the Shah. In reality, Khomeini used the prolonged crisis to eliminate moderate rivals and consolidate the Islamic Republic, making the stated demands largely irrelevant.