Prominent Western left-wing intellectuals were initially supportive of Ayatollah Khomeini. They were drawn to his anti-imperialist rhetoric about "the disinherited of the earth," mistakenly projecting their own ideals onto him and predicting he would usher in a "humane" form of governance.

Related Insights

Historically, murderous ideologies like those of Mao and Stalin gained traction by hiding behind benevolent promises ('free stuff'). This benign messaging makes them more deceptively dangerous than overtly aggressive ideologies like Nazism, which clearly signal their malevolence and are thus easier for the public to identify and reject.

Kicked out of Iraq, Khomeini landed in Paris. This unexpected move gave him unprecedented access to the world's press, turning him into an international figure and allowing him to broadcast his revolutionary message globally, which was crucial for his success.

While appearing as a traditionalist, Khomeini's core concept, the "Guardianship of the Jurist," was a profound theological revolution. It proposed for the first time that clerics should directly rule the state, breaking with centuries of Shiite political quietism. This innovation provided the ideological basis for the new republic.

The ruling elite has inverted from 80% ideologues at the revolution's start to 80% charlatans today. Expedience and financial gain, not revolutionary zeal, now bind the regime's core. This ideological hollowness makes the regime more brittle than its rhetoric suggests.

Days before Iran's 1978 revolution, President Jimmy Carter lauded the Shah's leadership and Iran's "stability." This highlights a catastrophic failure of intelligence and a reliance on superficial state-level relationships over understanding ground-level dissent.

The Iranian Revolution was fueled by a Shia worldview centered on martyrdom, cosmic struggle between good and evil, and an apocalyptic final battle. U.S. policymakers, lacking any understanding of this religious framework, were completely unprepared for its political power.

The concept of an "Islamic government" was deliberately left undefined. This vagueness allowed various anti-Shah groups—from secular liberals to Marxists—to project their own hopes onto the revolution, creating a broad but fragile coalition. The lack of detail was a feature, not a bug.

A faction of the American far-left, disillusioned with the revolutionary potential of the domestic working class, has begun to romanticize Islam as a powerful global force. They view it as a potential ally capable of challenging and defeating Western structures like colonialism and capitalism.

Ayatollah Khamenei believes that any attempt at reform, like Gorbachev's in the USSR, would accelerate the regime's collapse rather than prolong it. This formative experience informs his rigid refusal to cede ground on core principles like the mandatory hijab, ensuring a brutal response to dissent.

Ayatollah Khomeini's political genius was blending traditional religious conservatism with the era's fashionable anti-colonial nationalism. By framing the Shah as an American and Israeli puppet, he mobilized a broad coalition beyond just the deeply religious.