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The study presented three different datasets over a short period. While efficacy endpoints like PFS and OS changed, the toxicity data remained identical. This is highly unusual, as resolving censored patient data for efficacy should also lead to updated toxicity information, suggesting a rushed or incomplete analysis process.
Despite the ASCENT-07 trial failing its primary progression-free survival (PFS) endpoint, an early overall survival (OS) signal emerged. This divergence suggests the drug may confer a survival advantage not captured by the initial endpoint, complicating the definition of a "negative" trial and warranting further follow-up.
The CREST trial showed benefit driven by patients with carcinoma in situ (CIS), while the Potomac trial showed a lack of benefit in the same subgroup. This stark inconsistency demonstrates that subgroup analyses, even for stratified factors, can be unreliable and are a weak basis for regulatory decisions or label restrictions.
The FDA receives raw and cleaned datasets from sponsors, not just summary reports. Their internal teams conduct independent analyses, which can lead to findings or data presentations in the official drug label that differ from or expand upon what's in the published paper.
The study utilized "interruption-free survival" as a primary endpoint, a pragmatic measure derived from real-world data. This serves as a valuable surrogate for treatment toxicity, as clinicians typically pause treatment in response to adverse events, providing a quantifiable measure of a drug's real-world tolerability.
The enzalutamide arms saw discontinuation rates of 20-25% due to adverse events. This high rate reflects a different risk calculation for patients who feel healthy and are asymptomatic. Unlike in advanced disease where patients tolerate more toxicity, this population has a very low threshold for side effects, making early intervention a significant trade-off.
In the CREST trial, the FDA's critique heavily emphasized an overall survival hazard ratio above one. Though statistically insignificant and based on immature data, this single figure created a powerful suggestion of potential harm that overshadowed the positive primary endpoint and likely contributed to the panel's divided vote.
In solid tumor immunotherapy, significant efficacy gains almost always correlate with increased toxicity. This study's claim of nearly doubled progression-free survival with identical toxicity rates is biologically implausible and was a primary reason for skepticism, even before analyzing the trial's methodology.
The study reported that no patients in the "before 3 PM" group ever received a dose after 3 PM over four cycles. In a busy, real-world cancer center, such perfect adherence is practically impossible due to logistical issues. This flawless data suggests the study might be a retrospective analysis of curated data rather than a truly prospective trial.
Clinicians should avoid directly comparing the toxicity profiles of new ADCs, as the data often comes from different trial stages. A drug in a Phase 1 expansion cohort may appear more toxic than one with mature Phase 2 randomized data, making definitive safety assessments premature.
The study's progression-free survival (PFS) curve was unusually smooth, lacking the stepwise drops expected from scheduled scans in oncology trials. More alarmingly, the "numbers at risk" table showed more patients remaining than were represented on the graph at certain time points—a statistical impossibility suggesting a significant reporting or programming error.