The 5% default rate in private credit, compared to 3% in syndicated loans, is a function of its target market: smaller companies. Just as the Russell 2000 is more volatile than the Dow Jones, smaller businesses are inherently riskier. Applying leverage to a more volatile asset pool naturally results in more defaults.

Contrary to marketing narratives, Acadian Asset Management's analysis finds no evidence that private credit generates higher risk-adjusted returns than public credit. Analysis of private issuers within public indices shows they are simply riskier firms with higher yields to compensate, not a source of alpha.

Companies that grow via frequent acquisitions often exclude integration costs from adjusted metrics by labeling them "one-time" charges. This is misleading. For this business model, these are predictable, recurring operational expenses and should be treated as such by analysts calculating a company's true profitability.

In private markets, there's a perverse incentive for both private equity owners and private credit lenders to avoid marking down asset values. This "mark to make-believe" system keeps valuations artificially high, hiding underlying financial stress and delaying the recognition of losses.

The "canary in the coal mine" for private credit isn't SaaS debt but any over-leveraged company. A firm burdened by debt repayments lacks the capital to invest in AI and automation, making it vulnerable to disruption by less-leveraged, more innovative competitors in any industry, not just software.

A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.

Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.

The underwriting quality in private credit is declining. Key red flags include lenders accepting "EBITDA add-backs"—projected, unrealized earnings improvements—and allowing borrowers to retain more proceeds from asset sales. These terms signal a shift in negotiating power to borrowers and rising risk.

WeWork created "Community Adjusted EBITDA," a metric that conveniently excluded core costs like rent and salaries. This farcical KPI incentivized top-line growth at any cost, masking massive unprofitability and ultimately destroying shareholder value. Be wary of overly creative accounting.