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The underwriting quality in private credit is declining. Key red flags include lenders accepting "EBITDA add-backs"—projected, unrealized earnings improvements—and allowing borrowers to retain more proceeds from asset sales. These terms signal a shift in negotiating power to borrowers and rising risk.

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While private credit is a viable asset class, Ed Perks expresses caution. The tremendous amount of capital flooding the space creates pressure to deploy it, which can lead to less disciplined underwriting and potential credit quality issues. He notes this space warrants close monitoring due to its lack of transparency.

While default rates are a concern, the bigger issue is that loss-given-default will be higher. Historically, bank loans recovered 70% because covenants allowed early intervention. Today's covenant-lite private credit loans prevent this, likely pushing recovery rates down from 70% to the 40-50% range.

During the 2021-22 peak, private credit firms abandoned profit-based underwriting for "Annual Recurring Revenue" (ARR) loans to software companies. They gambled these companies would become profitable. Many have not, creating a vintage of bad loans that now poses a significant risk to the lenders who changed traditional lending economics.

The "canary in the coal mine" for private credit isn't SaaS debt but any over-leveraged company. A firm burdened by debt repayments lacks the capital to invest in AI and automation, making it vulnerable to disruption by less-leveraged, more innovative competitors in any industry, not just software.

After PIMCO's highly profitable $2 billion gain on a loan to a Meta data center, other private credit lenders are piling into the space. This fierce competition is driving down rates and weakening investor protections like covenants, a classic sign of a frothy market nearing its peak.

Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.

The fundamental model of private credit is sound. The primary risk stems from the sector's own success, which has attracted massive capital inflows. This creates pressure for managers to deploy capital, potentially leading to weakened underwriting standards and undisciplined growth.

The recent surge of retail capital into private credit had a tangible market impact, forcing managers to deploy capital quickly. This resulted in tighter spreads and weaker lending terms. As these flows moderate, this trend is reversing, creating better opportunities for new investments.

A sign of eroding discipline, private credit underwriters are beginning to offer covenant-lite deals, once unthinkable in a market known for strong investor protections. This shift indicates that intense competition for deals is forcing lenders to lower underwriting standards, mirroring a late-cycle trend previously seen in public markets.

Lenders are demanding more structural protections (like "anti-pet smart terms") to lock down collateral, while borrowers are negotiating for more economic flexibility (like generous EBITDA add-backs) to weather potential storms. This "flight to fortification" on both sides signals deep-seated market uncertainty.