Central bank credibility is a finite resource. By not fully stamping out inflation to its 2% target, the Fed depletes its credibility, making the next inflationary shock harder and more costly to control—a lesson from the recurring inflation of the 1980s.

Related Insights

Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.

The Federal Reserve's anticipated rate cuts are not merely a response to cooling inflation but a deliberate 'insurance' policy against a weak labor market. This strategy comes at the explicit cost of inflation remaining above the 2% target for a longer period, revealing a clear policy trade-off prioritizing employment over price stability.

The Federal Reserve cut rates despite inflation remaining above the 2% target. This action suggests a strategic shift towards tolerating slightly higher inflation—a "soft target" around 2.8%—to prevent the non-linear, snowballing effect of rising unemployment, which is much harder to reverse once it begins.

The Federal Reserve is prioritizing labor market stability by cutting rates, fully aware this choice means inflation will remain above its 2% target for longer. This is a conscious trade-off, accepting persistent inflation as the price for insuring the economy against significant job losses.

The Federal Reserve can tolerate inflation running above its 2% target as long as long-term inflation expectations remain anchored. This is the critical variable that gives them policy flexibility. The market's belief in the Fed's long-term credibility is what matters most.

While the direct impact of tariffs may be temporary, the elongated process risks making consumers and businesses comfortable with higher inflation. Combined with questions about the Federal Reserve's political independence, this could unmoor expectations and make inflation persistent.

History suggests that if inflation remains high for too long, it can alter public psychology. Businesses may become less hesitant to raise prices, and consumers may grow more accepting of them. This shift can create a self-perpetuating feedback loop, or 'snowball' effect, making inflation much harder for the central bank to control.

The Fed faces a political trap where the actions required to push inflation from ~2.9% to its 2% target would likely tank the stock market. The resulting wealth destruction is politically unacceptable to both the administration and the Fed itself, favoring tolerance for slightly higher inflation.

The longevity of above-target inflation is a primary concern for the Fed because it can fundamentally alter consumer and business behavior. Historical models based on low-inflation periods become less reliable. Businesses report being surprised that consumers are still accepting price increases, suggesting pricing power and inflation expectations may be stickier than anticipated.

The Fed faces a catch-22: current interest rates are too low to contain inflation but too high to prevent a recession. Unable to solve both problems simultaneously, the central bank has adopted a 'wait and see' approach, holding rates steady until either inflation or slowing growth becomes the more critical issue to address.