A specific arbitrage opportunity exists with serial acquirers. When they announce a deal that will significantly increase future earnings per share, the market often under-reacts. An investor can buy shares at a compressed forward multiple before the full impact of the acquisition is priced in.

The U.S. government (via CFIUS) forced Grindr's Chinese owner to sell within one year over national security concerns. This created a distressed, time-sensitive M&A situation with a limited buyer pool, which savvy, non-traditional investors were able to capitalize on.

Investors often reject ideas in markets where previous companies failed, a bias they call "scar tissue." This creates an opportunity for founders who can identify a key change—like new AI technology or shifting consumer behavior—that makes a previously impossible idea now viable.

The most lucrative exit for a startup is often not an IPO, but an M&A deal within an oligopolistic industry. When 3-4 major players exist, they can be forced into an irrational bidding war driven by the fear of a competitor acquiring the asset, leading to outcomes that are even better than going public.

The venture capital industry's tendency to fire founders is so ingrained that simply being founder-friendly became a competitive advantage for Founders Fund. Despite data showing founder-led companies outperform, the emotional 'thrill' of ousting a founder often leads VCs to make value-destructive decisions, creating a market inefficiency.

Grindr generated $100M in revenue and $45M in profit despite a dismal 1.8-star App Store rating and 19% Glassdoor score. These terrible qualitative metrics, paired with strong financials, indicated the company was severely undermanaged and ripe for a turnaround through basic operational improvements.

Grindr had a stack of issues: a privacy lawsuit, Chinese ownership (CFIUS), a PR problem, and homophobia. While most investors flee "one-problem" deals, this combination scared off nearly everyone, creating a massive opportunity for buyers who weren't deterred by the complexity.

To generate returns on a $10B acquisition, a PE firm needs a $25B exit, which often means an IPO. They must underwrite this IPO at a discount to public comps, despite having paid a 30% premium to acquire the company, creating a significant initial value gap to overcome from day one.

The current M&A landscape is defined by a valuation disparity where smaller companies trade at a discount to larger ones. This creates a clear strategic incentive for large corporations to drive growth by acquiring smaller, more affordable competitors.