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Rather than standing up a permanent four-star functional command for autonomous weapons, the Department of Defense would field systems faster through temporary, sunsetting task forces. A permanent combatant command creates layers of subordinate two-star headquarters and self-preserving equities that become impossible to dislodge. A focused task force can formalize tactical lessons into field doctrine without creating an unmanageable general-officer bureaucracy.
The Ukrainian conflict demonstrates the power of a fast, iterative cycle: deploy technology, see if it works, and adapt quickly. This agile approach, common in startups but alien to traditional defense, is essential for the U.S. to maintain its technological edge and avoid being outpaced.
The Army's "Transforming in Contact" initiative abandons long development cycles. Instead, it saturates units with abundant new technology, allowing soldiers to rapidly iterate and provide feedback on what is truly effective in the field, accelerating modernization.
Creating a dedicated 'AI Force' is counterproductive. By segregating expertise, it prevents AI from becoming a ubiquitous, force-wide capability. This approach risks creating an isolated bureaucracy rather than raising the median AI competency of the entire military, which is the actual goal.
After a casual challenge from the Secretary of the Army, Applied Intuition retrofitted its autonomous systems onto an infantry vehicle in 10 days. This proves complex defense applications can be rapidly developed, directly challenging the notion that military innovation requires multi-year procurement cycles.
Establishing a combatant command to lead autonomous weapons transformation misunderstands how combatant commands function. These commands prioritize immediate, near-term operational problems, rendering them susceptible to vendor pitches while operating on the periphery of the Pentagon's core budgeting processes. Historically, enduring force transformation has required service staff institutions, program and budgeting levers, and demand signals rather than operational warfighting headquarters.
A reform-minded leader can create ad-hoc teams and force collaboration between operators and technologists. However, these changes are often temporary. Once the leader departs, the military's established cultural norms and organizational structures, like powerful four-star commands, tend to reassert themselves, erasing the progress.
The Pentagon created a "submarine czar" role reporting directly to the Deputy Defense Secretary. This structure establishes a single point of accountability, enabling faster decisions, risk-taking, and the ability to cut through traditional bureaucracy that stalls critical defense programs.
In military AI, being three months ahead in developing a frontier model is irrelevant if the organization is five years behind in adopting and integrating existing capabilities. The crucial race is not about invention but about effective implementation, an area where the US military's bureaucracy poses a significant disadvantage.
Creating a centralized four-star command for autonomous weapons risks stalling real-time testing conducted by theater task forces. Rather than accelerating deployment, a centralized headquarters introduces committee-driven staffing processes, hundreds of headquarters personnel, and bureaucratic delays. Distributed experimentation at the tactical edge allows faster operational feedback and prototyping than a centralized Pentagon clearinghouse can provide.
Creating a separate command for drones and autonomy could segregate these capabilities, much like CyberCom. Instead of being integrated into combined arms at the lowest level, they become a resource that operational commanders must request through layers of bureaucracy, hindering agility.