In secret 1972 talks, the IRA delegation completely misread the situation, assuming their campaign of violence had forced the British to negotiate a full withdrawal. This fundamental misunderstanding—believing victory was imminent—doomed the talks from the start, as their demands were non-starters for the British government.

Both loyalist and republican paramilitaries in the 1960s saw themselves as inheritors of an earlier tradition. Groups like the UVF consciously modeled themselves on Sir Edward Carson's 1912 Ulster Volunteers, using this historical precedent to legitimize their violence.

The common narrative that The Troubles erupted suddenly in the 1960s is false. In 1939, the IRA conducted a sabotage campaign with bombings in major English cities, including London and Coventry. This earlier violence is largely erased from British collective memory.

Despite public perception and IRA propaganda, key British government figures privately favored withdrawing from Northern Ireland. They were deterred by the near-certainty that a pullout would trigger a full-scale civil war, a massive refugee crisis, and pleas from the Irish government to stay.

Following a disastrous border campaign, IRA leader Cathal Goulding shifted the organization's focus from armed struggle. Influenced by British Marxists, he advocated for a nonsectarian workers' alliance, leaving traditional republicans feeling betrayed and creating an ideological vacuum.

During clandestine peace talks, the senior MI6 officer Frank Steele found the IRA representatives, including Gerry Adams, to be "respectable," "intelligent," and "personable." He even admitted about one leader, "I know it's an unfashionable thing to say, but I liked him," highlighting the human complexity behind enemy lines.

Many long-serving IRA members felt the Good Friday Agreement was a betrayal. They had committed terrible acts, believing they had sold their "immortal souls" for the ultimate prize of a united Ireland. Settling for a power-sharing government made their violent sacrifices feel meaningless and futile.

During secret talks, an MI6 officer argued the IRA should try to persuade Protestants, not attack the British. The IRA flatly rejected this, stating their belief that violence was the only effective tool. Citing Britain's withdrawal from its empire, they concluded the UK would only "get fed up and go away" if the violence continued.

To articulate their identities, both Unionists and Nationalists drew parallels with international conflicts. Unionists saw themselves as a besieged people like Israelis, while Nationalists identified with Palestinians, using these global narratives to legitimize their local grievances.