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During clandestine peace talks, the senior MI6 officer Frank Steele found the IRA representatives, including Gerry Adams, to be "respectable," "intelligent," and "personable." He even admitted about one leader, "I know it's an unfashionable thing to say, but I liked him," highlighting the human complexity behind enemy lines.

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