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The disastrous rollout of Healthcare.gov deeply scarred the D.C. policy community. The received wisdom became to never bear technology risk directly. This incentivizes outsourcing everything to contractors, not just for expertise, but to create a buffer that can be blamed if a project fails, preserving the politician's reputation.
When one software vendor dominates a government sector, it creates a "software monoculture." This introduces systemic risk, where a single bug can be forked across dozens of states, simultaneously disabling critical services for millions of people, as seen when a Medicaid eligibility error affected 29 states.
An early, painful experience as acting CFO for a surgery center that struggled to get paid—a deal nicknamed "Death by a Thousand Cuts"—directly shaped the firm's successful healthcare strategy. This scar tissue led to a vow to avoid direct care provision and focus exclusively on less glamorous but more defensible IT and data infrastructure.
The political fallout from failed investments like Solyndra fosters a risk-averse government culture that undermines industrial policy. To succeed, public funding programs must accept that backing ventures the private market shuns will inevitably lead to some failures—a necessary cost for enabling major successes.
A regulator who approves a new technology that fails faces immense public backlash and career ruin. Conversely, they receive little glory for a success. This asymmetric risk profile creates a powerful incentive to deny or delay new innovations, preserving the status quo regardless of potential benefits.
The disastrous launch of Healthcare.gov illustrates a key public sector pitfall. The well-intentioned goal of 'fair' simultaneous access for all overruled the technically sound advice for a phased rollout. This resulted in a broken system that was ineffective for everyone, proving that a working system is a prerequisite for a fair one.
To minimize risk, government contracts often require bidders to have prior experience building the exact same system. This seemingly prudent rule creates a catch-22, barring new entrants and locking in a small number of incumbents who can then dominate the market and inflate prices.
When executing a large-scale government technology project, physically separating the technology team (e.g., in Bangalore) from the political and bureaucratic hub (e.g., in Delhi) is a crucial tactic. This creates a shield, allowing engineers to focus on deep work without constant interference.
Enterprises often default to internal IT teams or large consulting firms for AI projects. These groups typically lack specialized skills and are mired in politics, resulting in failure. This contrasts with the much higher success rate observed when enterprises buy from focused AI startups.
The public sector's aversion to risk is driven by the constant external threat of audits and public hearings from bodies like the GAO and Congress. This compliance-focused environment stifles innovation and discourages the "measured risk" taking necessary to attract modern tech talent who thrive on cutting-edge work.
A significant, often unspoken, value of third-party software is accountability. When a critical system like an open-source database fails, companies need a vendor to call for support and to bear responsibility, a crucial 'cover your ass' function.