Contrary to the feeling of rapid technological change, economic data shows productivity growth has been extremely low for 50 years. AI is not just another incremental improvement; it's a potential shock to a long-stagnant system, which is crucial context for its impact.

A "software-only singularity," where AI recursively improves itself, is unlikely. Progress is fundamentally tied to large-scale, costly physical experiments (i.e., compute). The massive spending on experimental compute over pure researcher salaries indicates that physical experimentation, not just algorithms, remains the primary driver of breakthroughs.

The tangible economic effect of the AI boom is currently concentrated in physical capital investment, such as data centers and software, rather than widespread changes in labor productivity or employment. A potential market correction would thus directly threaten this investment-led growth.

The AI buildout won't be stopped by technological limits or lack of demand. The true barrier will be economics: when the marginal capital provider determines that the diminishing returns from massive investments no longer justify the cost.

The argument is that "economic diffusion lag" is an excuse for AI's current limitations. If AI models were truly as capable as human employees, they would integrate into companies instantly—far faster than human hiring. The slow rollout proves they still lack core, necessary skills for broad economic value.

Arguments that AI chips are viable for 5-7 years because they still function are misleading. This "sleight of hand" confuses physical durability with economic usefulness. An older chip is effectively worthless if newer models offer exponentially better performance for the price ('dollar per flop'), making it uncompetitive.

AI's arrival is serendipitous, providing the necessary productivity boost and labor substitution to counteract a future of economic shrinkage caused by declining global populations. Without AI, we'd be facing a crisis.

Economist Tyler Cowen argues AI's productivity boost will be limited because half the US economy—government, nonprofits, higher education, parts of healthcare—is structurally inefficient and slow to adopt new tech. Gains in dynamic sectors are diluted by the sheer weight of these perpetually sluggish parts of the economy.

The slow adoption of AI isn't due to a natural 'diffusion lag' but is evidence that models still lack core competencies for broad economic value. If AI were as capable as skilled humans, it would integrate into businesses almost instantly.