The jet engine market is not a simple free-for-all. Competition is first structured by airframers like Boeing and Airbus, who decide whether to offer a single 'sole source' engine or 'dual source' options on a new aircraft. This initial strategic decision dictates the competitive landscape before airlines ever make their choice.
GE employs a razor-and-blades model on an industrial scale, accepting losses on initial engine sales to powerful airframers like Boeing. This secures a multi-decade, high-margin stream of mandated service and parts revenue from a fragmented base of airline customers, where aftermarket sales can be 3-5 times the original engine price.
Intense competition forces companies to innovate their products and marketing more aggressively. This rivalry validates the market's potential, accelerates its growth, and ultimately benefits the entire ecosystem and its customers, rather than being a purely zero-sum game.
Unlike most technologies that become cheaper over time, developing a new jet engine has grown more expensive, even on an inflation-adjusted basis, with new programs costing over $10 billion. This is because engines constantly push the frontiers of material science and engineering, keeping R&D costs and barriers to entry extraordinarily high.
GE serves two distinct customers: powerful airframers for the initial sale and a fragmented base of hundreds of airlines for aftermarket services. This split forces new entrants to solve a '3D puzzle' of satisfying both technically demanding OEMs and a global user base simultaneously, creating an immense and durable barrier to entry.
Unlike the broader aircraft parts market, the engine aftermarket is highly resistant to third-party 'PMA' parts. Even credible players like Pratt & Whitney have failed to copy GE parts. Technical complexity, voided warranties, and leasing company policies create a strong defense that protects lucrative service revenues.
The most lucrative exit for a startup is often not an IPO, but an M&A deal within an oligopolistic industry. When 3-4 major players exist, they can be forced into an irrational bidding war driven by the fear of a competitor acquiring the asset, leading to outcomes that are even better than going public.
Amadeus was formed by major airlines to create a neutral distribution system. This origin story provided immediate scale, credibility, and deep industry integration, creating a powerful competitive moat from day one that would be nearly impossible for a startup to replicate.
The choice between open and closed-source AI is not just technical but strategic. For startups, feeding proprietary data to a closed-source provider like OpenAI, which competes across many verticals, creates long-term risk. Open-source models offer "strategic autonomy" and prevent dependency on a potential future rival.
The extreme cost and technical risk of engine development make risk-sharing partnerships a strategic necessity. GE's most successful franchise, CFM International, is a 50-year-old joint venture with Safran that demonstrates how collaboration is essential to tackle projects that are too large for any single company to bear alone.
To mitigate its own risk, Apple's "50% rule" required suppliers to find other customers. This policy forced them to share advanced manufacturing processes co-developed with Apple, directly enabling the rise of Chinese smartphone rivals like Xiaomi and Huawei.