Financial history rhymes because the underlying driver—human nature—is constant. Core desires for wealth, recognition, and love, along with the fear of pain and envy of others' success, have remained unchanged for millennia. These emotions will continue to fuel bubbles and crashes, regardless of new technologies or financial instruments.
Today's massive AI company valuations are based on market sentiment ("vibes") and debt-fueled speculation, not fundamentals, just like the 1999 internet bubble. The market will likely crash when confidence breaks, long before AI's full potential is realized, wiping out many companies but creating immense wealth for those holding the survivors.
The rallying cry to give retail investors access to elite opportunities is not new; this same narrative fueled mass participation in the leveraged 1920s stock market bubble. Today, similar rhetoric surrounds cryptocurrency and private equity in 401(k)s, serving as a potential historical warning sign.
A guest offers a more precise alternative to the cliché that history rhymes: Voltaire's observation that "history never repeats itself, man always does." This insight pinpoints human nature—greed, fear, and FOMO—as the constant driver of speculative manias, even as the specific assets and technologies change.
Phenomena like bank runs or speculative bubbles are often rational responses to perceived common knowledge. People act not on an asset's fundamental value, but on their prediction of how others will act, who are in turn predicting others' actions. This creates self-fulfilling prophecies.
The primary driver of market fluctuations is the dramatic shift in attitudes toward risk. In good times, investors become risk-tolerant and chase gains ('Risk is my friend'). In bad times, risk aversion dominates ('Get me out at any price'). This emotional pendulum causes security prices to fluctuate far more than their underlying intrinsic values.
Contrary to popular belief, the 1929 crash wasn't an instantaneous event. It took a full year for public confidence to erode and for the new reality to set in. This illustrates that markets can absorb financial shocks, but they cannot withstand a sustained, spiraling loss of confidence.
Contrary to the popular belief that markets are forgetful, the speaker argues they are more traumatized by crashes (like 2008) than buoyed by bull runs. The constant crisis predictions and "Big Short" memes on social media demonstrate a powerful, persistent memory for loss over gain.
Recent credit failures and frauds are not 'systemic' risks that threaten the entire financial system's structure. Instead, they are 'systematic'—a regularly recurring behavioral phenomenon. Good times predictably lead to imprudent lending, creating clusters of defaults. The problem is human behavior, not a fundamental flaw in the market itself.
Contrary to intuition, widespread fear and discussion of a market bubble often precede a final, insane surge upward. The real crash tends to happen later, when the consensus shifts to believing in a 'new economic model.' This highlights a key psychological dynamic of market cycles where peak anxiety doesn't signal an immediate top.
Marks emphasizes that he correctly identified the dot-com and subprime mortgage bubbles without being an expert in the underlying assets. His value came from observing the "folly" in investor behavior and the erosion of risk aversion, suggesting market psychology is more critical than domain knowledge for spotting bubbles.