Unlike in past cycles, the riskiest underwriting has largely occurred in leveraged loans and private credit, not high-yield bonds. This migration has left the public high-yield market with higher-quality issuers and shorter durations, making it more resilient than its reputation suggests.

Contrary to the belief that hot credit markets encourage high leverage, data shows high-yield borrowers currently have leverage levels around four times, the lowest in two decades. This statistical reality contrasts sharply with gloomy market sentiment driven by anecdotal defaults, suggesting underlying strength in the asset class.

Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

As private credit funds absorb riskier, smaller deals, the public high-yield market is left with larger, more stable companies. This migration has improved the overall quality and lowered default rates for public high-yield bonds, creating a performance divergence.

Don't wait for public credit spreads to blow out as a warning sign. In a system where sovereign debt is the primary vulnerability and corporates are easily bailed out, credit spreads have become a coincident, not leading, indicator. The real leverage risk is hidden in private credit.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

Judging the credit market by its overall index spread is misleading. The significant gap between the tightest and widest spreads (high dispersion) reveals that the market is rewarding quality and punishing uncertainty. This makes individual credit selection far more important than a top-down market view.

The high-yield market's credit quality is at an all-time high, not due to broad economic strength, but because of a massive influx of 'fallen angels.' Downgrades of large, formerly investment-grade companies like Ford and Kraft Heinz have structurally improved the overall quality of the index.

The modern high-yield market is structurally different from its past. It's now composed of higher-quality issuers and has a shorter duration profile. While this limits potential upside returns compared to historical cycles, it also provides a cushion, capping the potential downside risk for investors.