The private Investment Grade (IG) market is widely misunderstood. It primarily consists of asset-backed or project finance deals for specific CapEx projects, often structured in separate SPVs. This makes it more akin to secured financing than a direct private alternative to public corporate bonds.
The term "middle market" is too broad for risk assessment. KKR's analysis indicates that default risk and performance dispersion are not uniform. Instead, they will be most pronounced in the lower, smaller end of the middle market, while the larger companies in the upper-middle market remain more resilient.
Companies are willing to pay a 150-200 basis point premium for private credit to gain a strategic partner who provides bespoke financing, governance, and expertise for complex needs like carve-outs. This partnership value proposition distinguishes it from transactional public markets.
A new, fast-growing segment is the middle-market CLO, which securitizes directly originated private credit loans instead of broadly syndicated ones. This structure represents a powerful convergence of liquid and private credit, growing from near-zero to 20% of total new CLO issuance and offering investors a new way to access private credit.
While the US private credit market is saturated, Europe's middle-market offers higher spreads (north of 600 basis points) and lower leverage. This opportunity is most pronounced in non-sponsor deals, a segment where large banks and public markets are less active, creating a lucrative niche.
A major segment of private credit isn't for LBOs, but large-scale financing for investment-grade companies against hard assets like data centers, pipelines, and aircraft. These customized, multi-billion dollar deals are often too complex or bespoke for public bond markets, creating a niche for direct lenders.
Corporations are increasingly shifting from asset-heavy to capital-light models, often through complex transactions like sale-leasebacks. This strategic trend creates bespoke financing needs that are better served by the flexible solutions of private credit providers than by rigid public markets.
Despite headlines blaming private credit for failures like First Brands, the vast majority (over 95%) of the exposure lies with banks and in the liquid credit markets. This narrative overlooks the structural advantages and deeper diligence inherent in private deals.
Unlike private equity (terminal value) or syndicated loans (interest-only), asset-based finance (ABF) provides front-loaded cash flows of both principal and interest. This structure inherently de-risks the investment over time, often returning significant capital before a potential default occurs.
The two credit markets are converging, creating a symbiotic relationship beneficial to both borrowers and investors. Instead of competing, they serve different needs, and savvy investors should combine them opportunistically rather than pitting them against each other.
A significant shift in corporate finance strategy has occurred: companies no longer universally strive for an investment-grade (IG) rating. Many firms, including 'fallen angels' downgraded from IG, are content to operate with a high-yield rating, finding the higher borrowing costs acceptable for their business models.